enhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/newslists/newslist-financial-stability/60Optimizely 12 CMS - LFPChttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2026/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q4-2025/The quarterly report also contains a section which describes the systemically important banks’ buffers against regulatory requirements. The purpose is to describe how much of the buffer of CET1 capital that is available to cover losses before the bank is in breach of a regulatory requirement or the Pillar 2 guidance. The report also demonstrates which regulatory requirement was the most restrictive at the end of the fourth quarter. The Debt Office makes decisions on MREL annually. Further information about MREL and its application for Swedish institutions is available in the Debt Office’s MREL policy and on the web page Minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL). Report: Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) – Compliance Q4 2025  https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2026/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q4-2025/Mon, 09 Mar 2026 08:00:32 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/decisions-on-resolution-plans-for-2026/The Debt Office manages systemically important banks and certain other institutions that have failed, or are at risk of failing, through a special procedure called resolution. The aim of resolution is to preserve critical functions of the financial system and real economy, as well as to mitigate adverse contagion effects so that financial stability can be maintained. To be able to implement resolution in an effective manner, the Debt Office decides on specific requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for the eight systemically important banks. MREL is designed so that the banks’ shareholders and creditors – not taxpayers – are to ensure that the bank has sufficient financial resources to continue operating. In order to fully evaluate the banks’ capacity and capability to support a resolution procedure, we need to transition to testing specific components of the banks. In 2025, the Debt Office has assessed whether the systemically important banks have the capacity and capability to support a resolution procedure. The assessments have been based on the banks’ own evaluations of their capacity. The banks must also conduct these self-evaluations in accordance with the guidelines on resolvability from the European Banking Authority (EBA). In the coming years, the Debt Office will transition to testing the banks’ operational capabilities on the basis of the EBA’s guidelines. The tests may, for instance, include determining whether the capability exists to provide information that enables a valuation of the bank, the bank has a suitable communications plan, or whether the services needed for the bank’s operations will continue to function during resolution. “The systemically important banks’ work to become resolvable continues to be a focus area for the Debt Office. We see progress being made, but further measures are needed. In order to fully evaluate the banks’ capacity and capability to support a resolution procedure, we need to transition to testing specific components of the banks’ resolvability,” says Debt Office Director General Karolina Ekholm. The eight systemically important banks and their MREL, 31 december 2025 Bank Total risk-weighted requirement [1]  Total non-risk-weighted requirement [2]  Handelsbanken  26.29 6.00 SEB 27.22 6.00 Swedbank  27.40 6.00 Landshypotek 22.30 6.00 Länsförsäkringar 22.42 6.00 SBAB 22.00 6.00 Skandiabanken  21.66 6.00 Sparbanken Skåne 21.77 6.00 [1] Share of risk-weighted exposure amount (REA).  [2] Proportion of leverage ratio exposure (LRE). Note: For more information on how MREL is calculated, see the decision memorandum Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL), as well as the MREL policy (in Swedish). Table for all MREL and the Swedish systemically important banks.  Banks are to comply with EBA guidelines The EBA’s guidelines for improving resolvability for institutions and resolution authorities (EBA/GL/2022/01) entered into force on 1 January 2024. These guidelines are a key tool in the Debt Office’s assessment of the banks’ resolvability. Insufficient compliance with the guidelines can be grounds for the Debt Office to determine that there are substantive impediments to resolution. In 2025, the Debt Office has continued to evaluate the banks’ compliance with these guidelines. Although we have not identified any substantive impediments to resolution, there are nevertheless a number of areas in which further measures are needed in order to strengthen resolvability. https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/decisions-on-resolution-plans-for-2026/Fri, 19 Dec 2025 08:00:00 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q3-2025/The quarterly report also contains a section which describes the systemically important banks’ buffers against regulatory requirements. The purpose is to describe how much of the buffer of CET1 capital that is available to cover losses before the bank is in breach of a regulatory requirement or the Pillar 2 guidance. The report also demonstrates which regulatory requirement was the most restrictive at the end of the third quarter. The Debt Office makes decisions on MREL annually. Further information about MREL and its application for Swedish institutions is available in the Debt Office’s MREL policy and on our website. Report: Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) – Compliance Q3 2025https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q3-2025/Mon, 08 Dec 2025 08:00:00 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q2-2025/The quarterly report also contains a section which describes the systemically important banks’ buffers against regulatory requirements. The purpose is to describe how much of the buffer of CET1 capital that is available to cover losses before the bank is in breach of a regulatory requirement or the Pillar 2 guidance. The report also demonstrates which regulatory requirement was the most restrictive at the end of the second quarter. The Debt Office makes decisions on MREL annually. Further information about MREL and its application for Swedish institutions is available in the Debt Office’s MREL policy and on our website. The report Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) – Compliance Q2 2025https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q2-2025/Mon, 08 Sep 2025 08:00:00 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q1-2025/The quarterly report also contains a section which describes the systemically important banks’ buffers against regulatory requirements. The purpose is to describe how much of the buffer of CET1 capital that is available to cover losses before the bank is in breach of a regulatory requirement or the Pillar 2 guidance. The report also demonstrates which regulatory requirement was the most restrictive at the end of the first quarter. The Debt Office makes decisions on MREL annually. Further information about MREL and its application for Swedish institutions is available in the Debt Office’s MREL policy and on the Debt Office’s website. The report Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) – Compliance Q1 2025.  https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q1-2025/Fri, 11 Jul 2025 08:00:00 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/20252/esma-provides-guidance-on-a-tool-for-central-counterparty-resolution/The briefing, which is the first of its kind, was developed by ESMA’s CCP Resolution Committee. It provides a method that national resolution authorities may refer to when implementing the resolution tool known as a resolution cash call. According to the guidance, resolution authorities subject to the common EU regulatory framework are to define what data must be retrieved from a CCP for calibrating the resources that need to be made available through a cash call. In the event of this, the resolution authority should take into account the impact on various factors, such as clearing members and financial stability. Resolution authorities also need to ensure that processes are in place for executing cash calls, as well as regularly test that such processes function properly. The full report is available on ESMA’s website: CCP Resolution Briefing on the Operationalisation of resolution cash calls Read more about the Debt Office’s resolution tools for central counterpartieshttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/20252/esma-provides-guidance-on-a-tool-for-central-counterparty-resolution/Thu, 03 Jul 2025 16:25:00 GMTNewsFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/new-resolution-plan-for-central-counterparties-as-of-23-june/The new resolution plan will apply as of 23 June. The Debt Office is to prepare a resolution plan for central counterparties each year, on which the Resolution Board then decides. In Sweden, there is one central counterparty, Nasdaq Clearing Aktiebolag. The resolution plan describes, among other things, the strategies that the Debt Office intends to use in resolution as well as the Debt Office’s assessment of the central counterparty’s resolvability. The resolution plan is an important tool for being able to best carry out resolution if necessary.https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/new-resolution-plan-for-central-counterparties-as-of-23-june/Mon, 23 Jun 2025 08:00:00 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/20252/joint-approach-regarding-liquidity-support-in-bank-resolution/The Debt Office and the Riksbank both play important roles in safeguarding financial stability and will cooperate closely and constructively with each other in the event that a bank is put into resolution. It would be very costly for the economy if a systemically important bank were allowed to fail. The Swedish National Debt Office can therefore take control (but not take over ownership) of a failing systemically important bank and then restructure or transfer the business in an orderly manner. This procedure, known as resolution, restores the bank's viability. A necessary condition for the successful restructuring of a bank in resolution is that the bank is able to fund itself. The basic principle of the resolution procedure is that the bank's owners and lenders – not the taxpayers – continue to finance the bank. However, during a transitional phase, a bank in resolution may find it difficult to obtain sufficient liquidity on its own and may therefore need temporary liquidity support. Both the Debt Office and the Riksbank are authorised to grant such support. The Debt Office and the Riksbank have developed a joint approach to liquidity support for banks in resolution, which aims to make it clearer to market participants how the liquidity supply for a bank in resolution can be secured. "If a systemically important bank needs to be placed in resolution, both the Swedish National Debt Office and the Riksbank are ready to quickly take the measures required to maintain financial stability. Our joint approach to ensuring liquidity in resolution further strengthens this preparedness,” says Karolina Ekholm, Director General of the Swedish National Debt Office. “The Riksbank and the Swedish National Debt Office are prepared to act and cooperate in a crisis. Liquidity provision is central to successful crisis management. It is therefore positive for financial stability that we have developed an approach to provide liquidity to banks in resolution,” says Riksbank Governor Erik Thedéen. Document: Approach to liquidity provisionhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/20252/joint-approach-regarding-liquidity-support-in-bank-resolution/Mon, 02 Jun 2025 09:30:00 GMTNewsFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/20252/debt-office-in-joint-letter-to-eba-on-rulebook-for-banking-crisis-management/The Debt Office, together with the other resolution authorities in the Nordic region, has sent a joint letter to the EBA on the need for a banking crisis management rulebook that is more straightforward without jeopardising financial stability. The EU-wide Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) has improved the prospects for resolution authorities to manage banks in crisis. Nevertheless, the endeavour to create a comprehensive harmonised rulebook has led to a highly detailed and complex regulatory framework. The key message of the letter is that a more principal-based and risk-oriented framework with a lower level of detail would provide resolution authorities with better conditions for improving their operational readiness to manage banks in crisis, as well as direct resources towards the areas of greatest significance for financial stability. Read the letter in full: Nordic Resolution Authorities Letter on Simplification  https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/20252/debt-office-in-joint-letter-to-eba-on-rulebook-for-banking-crisis-management/Fri, 09 May 2025 08:59:00 GMTNewsFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q4-2024/The quarterly report now also contains a section which describes the systemically important banks’ buffers against regulatory requirements. The purpose is to describe how much of the buffer of CET1 capital that is available to cover losses before the bank is in breach of a regulatory requirement or the Pillar 2 guidance. The report also demonstrates which regulatory requirement was the most restrictive at the end of the fourth quarter. The Debt Office makes decisions on MREL annually. Further information about MREL and its application for Swedish institutions is available in the Debt Office’s MREL policy and on the Debt Office's website. The report Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) – Compliance Q4 2024.https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q4-2024/Thu, 06 Mar 2025 08:00:00 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/20252/adjustment-of-resolution-fees-for-2023/In the spring of 2024, the Debt Office discovered an error in the calculation model that is used to distribute the fee among those institutions that pay a risk-adjusted fee. The error stems from one of the risk indicators used in the calculation and led to 28 institutions paying a fee that was too high. In total, the incorrect fees amount to SEK 31,118,000. This corresponds to 0.77 per cent of the SEK 4.06 billion in total fees charged for 2023. For the institutions that will receive a repayment, the incorrect fee amounts to between 0.04 per cent and 14.16 per cent of their respective charged fee. The Debt Office takes this error very seriously, and the agency has therefore taken measures to both correct the error and make sure that it does not happen again. We have recalculated the fee for 2023 to ensure that the institutions that paid a fee that was too high will now have a portion of that fee repaid. We have also improved internal processes, procedures, and systems. As the incorrect fee is a small portion of the total fee charged, it neither affects the forthcoming fees nor the point in time at which the resolution reserve is expected to reach the target level. Today, the Debt Office contacted those institutions that will receive a repayment of funds. Read more about resolution feeshttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/20252/adjustment-of-resolution-fees-for-2023/Wed, 26 Feb 2025 13:40:08 GMTNewsFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2024/this-years-decisions-on-resolution-plans/The Swedish National Debt Office manages systemically important banks that have failed, or are at risk of failing, through resolution. If banks that are deemed systemically important were to be put into bankruptcy instead, the consequences for the financial system could be substantial. To be able to implement resolution, the Debt Office decides on MREL. These requirements are designed so that the banks’ shareholders and creditors – not taxpayers – are to bear the costs of crisis management. The banks have developed several aspects of their work, but there are also areas in which we have identified a need for further measures Since 1 January 2024, the systemically important banks must comply with the European Banking Authority’s (EBA) guidelines for resolvability as well. These guidelines are also intended to improve the feasibility of the Debt Office being able to carry out resolution. “The Debt Office continues to work actively in order to strengthen its capability of managing banks in crisis through resolution. Part of this effort is evaluating the banks’ internal capacity and capabilities. The banks have developed several aspects of their work, but there are also areas in which we have identified a need for further measures,” says Debt Office Director General Karolina Ekholm. The Debt Office deems eight banks to be systemically important. The eight systemically important banks and their MREL, 1 January 2025 Bank Total risk-weighted requirement1  Total non-risk-weighted requirement2  Handelsbanken  26.83 6.00 SEB 27.52 6.00 Swedbank  28.65 6.00 Landshypotek 22.30 6.00 Länsförsäkringar 22.70 6.00 SBAB 22.24 6.00 Skandiabanken  21.66 6.00 Sparbanken Skåne 22.11 6.00 1Proportion of REA.  2Proportion of LRE. Note: For more information on how MREL is calculated, see the decision memorandum Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) as well as the MREL policy (both in Swedish).  See the table for all MREL for the Swedish systemically important banks. Banks are to comply with the new EBA guidelines The EBA’s guidelines for improving resolvability for institutions and resolution authorities (EBA/GL/2022/01) entered into force on 1 January 2024. These guidelines are a key tool in the Debt Office’s assessment of the banks’ resolvability. Insufficient compliance with the guidelines can be grounds for the Debt Office to determine that there are substantive impediments to resolution. In 2024, the Debt Office has for the first time evaluated the banks’ compliance with the guidelines since they took effect. The Debt Office has not identified any substantive impediments to resolution. Nevertheless, the authority has identified a number of areas where measures must be taken in order to improve resolvability. Most banks are not deemed systemically important The majority of the banks for which the Debt Office conducts resolution planning are not deemed systemically important. The Debt Office is therefore planning for these to be wound up through bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings if they were to fail. For banks in this category, the Debt Office has made decisions on so-called simplified resolution plans and on MREL that does not exceed the capital requirements (investments firms are also included in this category). Deposit insurance always applies Regardless of how a bank in crisis is managed, deposit insurance applies. This means that the Debt Office pays out compensation to private individuals, companies, and other legal persons if a bank were to fail. Depositors’ money is protected up to the amount of SEK 1,050,000 per depositor and institution. Read more about the Resolution Board. https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2024/this-years-decisions-on-resolution-plans/Fri, 20 Dec 2024 08:00:00 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2024/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q3-2024/The Debt Office makes decisions on MREL annually. Further information about MREL and its application for Swedish institutions is available in the Debt Office’s MREL policy and on our website. The report Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) – Compliance Q3 2024https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2024/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q3-2024/Fri, 29 Nov 2024 08:00:00 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/2024/nordic-baltic-crisis-simulation-exercise-2024/Nearly 450 participants took part in the exercise, representing authorities from Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden, as well as the relevant European Union authorities: European Commission, ECB, Single Resolution Board (SRB) and European Banking Authority (EBA). A staff member of the International Monetary Fund was also invited to participate as an observer. The purpose of the exercise was to test communication, information sharing and collaboration between the authorities during crisis management in a highly uncertain and time pressured environment. The exercise was designed in line with a crisis scenario where the fictitious banks went through three phases that could be foreseen in a bank crisis management process: 1) the transition from normal business to recovery including addressing liquidity issues, 2) the movement from recovery to resolution, with resolution authorities assuming control of the bank and 3) after resolution, the return of the restructured bank to the market. During the exercise, authorities applied the tools and powers at their disposal according to the EU regulatory framework for banking supervision and crisis management.  Following the successful conclusion of the exercise, authorities will document and share the lessons learnt, and will integrate them into their existing crisis management routines. This will strengthen their crisis preparedness and further enhance the crisis management framework in the Nordic-Baltic region. A preparation team established under the Nordic Baltic Stability Group (NBSG) and led by the Danish resolution entity Finansiel Stabilitet was formed in 2023 to prepare the exercise. The team was advised by Oliver Wyman in the preparation of the exercise. The NBSG consists of government ministries, central banks, supervisory authorities, and resolution authorities in the eight Nordic and Baltic countries. In the context of the NBSG, the Nordic and Baltic authorities have agreed to conduct regular financial crisis simulation exercises.  https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/2024/nordic-baltic-crisis-simulation-exercise-2024/Fri, 20 Sep 2024 15:00:00 GMTNewsFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2024/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q2-2024/The Debt Office makes decisions on MREL annually. Further information about MREL and its application for Swedish institutions is available in the Debt Office’s MREL policy and on our website. The report Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) – Compliance Q2 2024.https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2024/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q2-2024/Fri, 30 Aug 2024 08:00:00 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2024/new-resolution-plan-for-central-counterparties-as-of-17-june/The new resolution plan will apply as of 17 June. The Debt Office is to prepare a resolution plan for central counterparties each year, on which the Resolution Board then decides. In Sweden, there is one central counterparty, Nasdaq Clearing Aktiebolag. The resolution plan is an important tool for being able to best carry out resolution if necessary.https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2024/new-resolution-plan-for-central-counterparties-as-of-17-june/Mon, 17 Jun 2024 08:00:00 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2024/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q1-2024/The Debt Office makes decisions on MREL annually. Further information about MREL and its application for Swedish institutions is available in the Debt Office’s MREL policy and on the Debt Office’s website. The report Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) – Compliance Q1 2024.https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2024/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q1-2024/Fri, 31 May 2024 08:00:00 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/2024/clarification-regarding-exemptions-for-tap-issuances-of-eligible-liabilities/In order to conduct MREL tap issuances, an issuer needs to be able to demonstrate that the reset mechanisms applying at the call date do not give rise to incentives to redeem. The EBA’s statements on the matter, as set out in the Monitoring Report EBA/REP/2023/23, together with Commission Delegated Regulation EU 241/2014, clarify how market participants need to act to avoid such incentives arising. Incentives to redeem can arise for issuances that have a call option, with associated reset mechanisms, which leads to a higher yield on the bond upon reset. In such a situation, incentives increase for an issuer to redeem/repurchase the bond at the exercise date of the call option (the call date). Tap issuances follow the same final terms as in the original issuance. However, the issue price – and thus the yield – in each tap, may differ from the original issuance. An issuer needs to conduct tap issuances at levels that do not create incentives to redeem. The issuer shall be able to demonstrate this on the request of the Debt Office and/or Finansinspektionen.https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/2024/clarification-regarding-exemptions-for-tap-issuances-of-eligible-liabilities/Fri, 26 Apr 2024 14:00:00 GMTNewsFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/2024/focus-report-lessons-from-the-banking-problems-in-the-us-and-switzerland-in-2023/A number of foreign banks encountered major problems in the spring of 2023. These were three relatively small banks in the US – Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, and First Republic Bank – and Credit Suisse, a globally systemically important bank headquartered in Switzerland. US and Swiss authorities were forced to intervene and manage the problems at these banks in order to prevent major disturbances to the financial system. Although the causes and courses of events differed in several respects, in both countries the crisis management by the authorities relied to some extent on solutions that were not planned in advance. Nevertheless, these government agencies achieved their primary objective of preserving financial stability. Most experts agree that the problems encountered are mainly attributable to insufficient supervision and requirements for the banks, as well as to business models that proved unsustainable in a high interest-rate environment. However, there is also cause to reflect on whether the banking crisis management regulations designed after the 2007–2008 global financial crisis are effective. The Debt Office’s Focus Report Lessons from the banking problems in the US and Switzerland in 2023 is written by Mattias Fransson, Karolina Holmberg, and Markus Ribbing. Focus report: Lessons from the banking problems in the US and Switzerland in 2023https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/2024/focus-report-lessons-from-the-banking-problems-in-the-us-and-switzerland-in-2023/Mon, 22 Apr 2024 17:00:22 GMTNewsFinancial stabilityFocus Reporthttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/2024/The-Debt-Office-follows-guidelines-on-the-summary-of-resolution-plans/The guidelines apply as of 9 April 2024. Guidelines on the summary of resolution plans (europa.eu)https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/2024/The-Debt-Office-follows-guidelines-on-the-summary-of-resolution-plans/Tue, 09 Apr 2024 08:00:00 GMTNewsFinancial stability