enhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/newslists/newslist-financial-stability/60Optimizely 12 CMS - LFPChttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/2026/debt-office-proposes-policy-for-assessing-which-banks-should-be-managed-through-resolution/The Debt Office is Sweden’s resolution authority, which means that we are responsible for managing systemically important banks and certain other financial institutions via resolution if they are no longer viable and are failing. This responsibility includes assessing which banks are to be managed through resolution and are therefore deemed systemically important. The assessment is based on the potential consequences if a bank were to fail. “By developing a policy and circulating it for consultation, we intend to both increase understanding of the Debt Office’s resolution work as well as make our assessments more predictable,” says Fredrik Bystedt, head of the Financial Stability department. The aim of managing systemically important banks via resolution is to avoid serious disruptions of the financial system and ensure that critical services and functions for the real economy can continue to be provided. Banks that in the Debt Office’s assessment are not to be managed through resolution are to instead be wound up through bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings if they are no longer viable. “In the policy, we describe the approach that the Debt Office applies for determining which banks are systemically important. The systemic importance assessment is based on a number of indicators with related thresholds, although it is not done strictly on the basis of these thresholds. We conduct an overall assessment that can also take into account other circumstances, including those which may be relevant in an actual crisis,” says Louise Welin, senior analyst at the Financial Stability department. The Debt Office conducts an annual assessment to determine which banks should be managed through resolution. This assessment is presented in a resolution plan that is prepared and decided on for every bank in Sweden. Resolution planning is vital for being able to manage a bank in distress effectively in an actual crisis. The Debt Office usually decides on a new resolution plan in December. The last day to respond to the policy proposal is 4 September 2026. Proposal for a Policy for assessing whether a bank should be managed through resolutionhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/2026/debt-office-proposes-policy-for-assessing-which-banks-should-be-managed-through-resolution/Thu, 02 Jul 2026 08:32:51 GMTNewsFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/2026/banking-crisis-management-is-focus-of-international-conference-in-stockholm/Panel members, from the left: Claudia Buch, John Vickers, Nicolas Véron, Dominique Laboureix and Karolina Ekholm.  The conference took place on 10 and 11 June and comprised presentations, discussions, and panel discussions with decision-makers, researchers, and experts from a number of countries. The speakers were invited by the Swedish National Debt Office and the Center for Monetary Policy and Financial Stability (CeMoF) at Stockholm University to share their perspectives and discuss managing banks in crisis. Commemorated ten years of EU resolution regulations in Sweden The conference marked ten years since the EU-wide resolution framework was introduced in Sweden. Over two days, discussions were held on how the regulatory framework has worked in practice and how it can be further developed to bolster financial stability. “The conference was a way of calling attention to the significance of having a resolution framework for being prepared to manage banks in crisis – without severe disruption of the financial system ensuing or taxpayers being left with the bill. Several participants emphasised the importance of continuing to develop the framework and of bringing decision-makers and researchers together to discuss these issues from their respective perspectives,” says Debt Office Director General Karolina Ekholm. Regulatory framework and practical application in focus on Day 1 The first day was hosted by the Debt Office with a focus on policy issues. The discussion topics included the progress made in strengthening the resilience of banks and establishing the new resolution framework, as well as the challenges that remain. Attention was also brought to the importance of access to liquidity in crisis situations. Speakers day 1. Top row from the left: Ricardo Reis, Claudia Buch, John Vickers, Nicolas Véron, Dominique Laboureix and Karolina Ekholm. Bottom row from the left: Alain Girard, Stefan Ingves, Patrick Honohan, Lene Kjaer and John Vickers.  Research and experiences in focus on Day 2 The second day focused on current research and was hosted by the Center for Monetary Policy and Financial Stability (CeMoF) at Stockholm University. Several studies were presented on how banking crisis management has developed and how the regulations can be adapted to new risks. Speakers day 2. Top row from the left: Erlend Nier, Farzad Saidi, Elena Carletti. Bottow row from the left: Martin Oehmke and Mariassunta Giannetti. Read comments from speakers Some of the speeches are published on the websites of the respective organisations. Here are links to a few of them. Dominique Laboureix is Chair of the Single Resolution Board (SRB). His speech was on the role of crisis management reforms in restoring and maintaining confidence in the financial system:  “Once trust runs out, history shows us, consequences can be catastrophic. In the worst cases, the entire system’s credibility needs to be rebuilt from scratch.” The speech is available in its entirety on the Single Resolution Board’s website. Panel members, from the left: Patrick Honohan, Erik Thedéen, Tuija Taos, Jan Marc Berk and Martin Flodén. Riksbank Governer Erik Thedéen emphasised that banks and other monetary policy counterparties must ensure that they have both the operative capability and preparedness to borrow money from the Riksbank: “To ensure that banks can borrow from the Riksbank quickly and efficiently when needed, we are considering introducing mandatory test transactions, but as a first step, our counterparties are now recommended to voluntarily test their operational capacity by borrowing from the Riksbank.” The speech is available in its entirety on the Riksbank’s website. More presentations can be found on Stockholm University's website. Photography: Viveca Karström Encrantzhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/2026/banking-crisis-management-is-focus-of-international-conference-in-stockholm/Thu, 25 Jun 2026 11:07:22 GMTNewsFinancial stabilityAbout the Debt Officehttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2026/new-resolution-plan-for-central-counterparties-as-of-18-june/The new resolution plan will apply as of 18 June. The Debt Office is to prepare a resolution plan for central counterparties each year, on which the Resolution Board then decides. In Sweden, there is one central counterparty, Nasdaq Clearing Aktiebolag. The resolution plan describes, among other things, the strategies that the Debt Office intends to use in resolution as well as the Debt Office’s assessment of the central counterparty’s resolvability. The resolution plan is an important tool for being able to best carry out resolution if necessary.  https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2026/new-resolution-plan-for-central-counterparties-as-of-18-june/Thu, 18 Jun 2026 08:00:31 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/2026/swedish-national-debt-office-and-stockholm-university-hold-two-day-international-conference-on-banking-crisis-management/On 10 and 11 June, the Swedish National Debt Office, together with the Center for Monetary Policy and Financial Stability (CeMoF) at Stockholm University, is holding an international conference with invited speakers and guests that work with or conduct research on financial crises and crisis management of banks. The conference marks the ten-year anniversary of Sweden’s implementation of the EU-wide regulatory framework for managing banks in crisis – known as the resolution framework – that was created after the global financial crisis. The first day consisted of presentations and panel discussions with Swedish and international decision-makers, researchers, and other experts on banking crisis management.  “This framework, which marks its tenth anniversary this year, has provided us with tools and powers to manage systemically important banks if they should fail, while also creating entirely new prospects for them to be prepared for a future crisis. Planning requirements have generated crisis preparedness at the institutional level in a way that did not previously exist. As a government authority responsible for financial stability, it is essential that we maintain and further develop the framework,” says Debt Office Director General Karolina Ekholm. Representatives from the Center for Monetary Policy and Financial Stability (CeMoF) at Stockholm University also emphasise the importance of discourse and the exchange of knowledge. “Resolution is a new area. To be able to teach the subject at Stockholm University, our collaboration with the Debt Office has been crucial. With this conference, we now also hope to strengthen our network as well as our research environment in this area over time,” says Roine Vestman, professor and director of CeMoF at Stockholm University. Important perspectives from day 1 Several key issues were addressed during the day: The relationship between banks in crisis and sovereign debt development and how the crisis management framework can help reduce this connection. How the crisis management framework can continue to be developed in order to bolster financial stability. Lessons from previous banking crises and how these lessons may be utilised in the future. Maintaining confidence and liquidity reserves in a crisis. Speaker perspectives One of the speakers was Alain Girard, member of the Executive Board, Head of the Banks division, the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA): “Optionality in resolution, enshrined in sound legal powers as well as at operational level – which means that crisis simulations have to be a core activity and responsibility for resolution authorities – is crucial for resolution regulation, planning and preparation." Another speaker was Erik Thedéen, Governor of the Riksbank and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). He participated in a panel session on how liquidity stress may unfold, how liquidity and confidence can be safeguarded across the crisis lifecycle, and where current frameworks may be improved: “It was a very engaging panel discussion, which underscored both the importance and difficulty of being prepared for a crisis. After all, it has been quite some time since we experienced a crisis in Sweden. The discussion also illustrated the difference between the Eurosystem, which has the ECB and a centralised resolution authority, and Sweden – which operates outside both entities but must maintain close cooperation with them.” Continuation day 2 The conference will continue tomorrow with a focus on the latest research on banking crisis management. Presentations will cover studies and analysis examining developments in this area. Full conference programme.https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/2026/swedish-national-debt-office-and-stockholm-university-hold-two-day-international-conference-on-banking-crisis-management/Wed, 10 Jun 2026 22:00:37 GMTNewsFinancial stabilityAbout the Debt Officehttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2026/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q1-2026/The quarterly report also contains a section which describes the systemically important banks’ buffers against regulatory requirements. The purpose is to describe how much of the buffer of CET1 capital that is available to cover losses before the bank is in breach of a regulatory requirement or the Pillar 2 guidance. The report also demonstrates which regulatory requirement was the most restrictive at the end of the first quarter. The Debt Office makes decisions on MREL annually. Further information about MREL and its application for Swedish institutions is available in the Debt Office’s MREL policy and on the webpage Minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL). The report: Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) – Compliance Q1 2026https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2026/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q1-2026/Mon, 08 Jun 2026 08:05:43 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/2026/esma-clarifies-operationalisation-of-resolution-tool-wdci-for-central-counterparties/The briefing has been developed by ESMA’s CCP Resolution Committee. It provides a method for NRAs to refer to when implementing the resolution tool called the write down and conversion of instruments tool (WDCI). The Swedish National Debt Office and other NRAs that are subject to the EU-wide regulation should, according to the regulatory framework, define what data is to be collected by the CCP in order to identify and calibrate the resources that are available for write down. In conjunction with this, we should take into account various factors, such as the impact on clearing members, financial-market infrastructures, and financial stability. Furthermore, we should ensure that there are processes in place for effectively implementing the WDCI, including preparations for the reorganisation of the CCP following the implementation. The full report is available on ESMA’s website. News article from 3 July 2025: ESMA provides guidance on a tool for central counterparty resolution Read more about the Debt Office’s resolution tools for central counterpartieshttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/2026/esma-clarifies-operationalisation-of-resolution-tool-wdci-for-central-counterparties/Wed, 20 May 2026 15:24:00 GMTNewsFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2026/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q4-2025/The quarterly report also contains a section which describes the systemically important banks’ buffers against regulatory requirements. The purpose is to describe how much of the buffer of CET1 capital that is available to cover losses before the bank is in breach of a regulatory requirement or the Pillar 2 guidance. The report also demonstrates which regulatory requirement was the most restrictive at the end of the fourth quarter. The Debt Office makes decisions on MREL annually. Further information about MREL and its application for Swedish institutions is available in the Debt Office’s MREL policy and on the web page Minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL). Report: Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) – Compliance Q4 2025  https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2026/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q4-2025/Mon, 09 Mar 2026 08:00:32 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/decisions-on-resolution-plans-for-2026/The Debt Office manages systemically important banks and certain other institutions that have failed, or are at risk of failing, through a special procedure called resolution. The aim of resolution is to preserve critical functions of the financial system and real economy, as well as to mitigate adverse contagion effects so that financial stability can be maintained. To be able to implement resolution in an effective manner, the Debt Office decides on specific requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for the eight systemically important banks. MREL is designed so that the banks’ shareholders and creditors – not taxpayers – are to ensure that the bank has sufficient financial resources to continue operating. In order to fully evaluate the banks’ capacity and capability to support a resolution procedure, we need to transition to testing specific components of the banks. In 2025, the Debt Office has assessed whether the systemically important banks have the capacity and capability to support a resolution procedure. The assessments have been based on the banks’ own evaluations of their capacity. The banks must also conduct these self-evaluations in accordance with the guidelines on resolvability from the European Banking Authority (EBA). In the coming years, the Debt Office will transition to testing the banks’ operational capabilities on the basis of the EBA’s guidelines. The tests may, for instance, include determining whether the capability exists to provide information that enables a valuation of the bank, the bank has a suitable communications plan, or whether the services needed for the bank’s operations will continue to function during resolution. “The systemically important banks’ work to become resolvable continues to be a focus area for the Debt Office. We see progress being made, but further measures are needed. In order to fully evaluate the banks’ capacity and capability to support a resolution procedure, we need to transition to testing specific components of the banks’ resolvability,” says Debt Office Director General Karolina Ekholm. The eight systemically important banks and their MREL, 31 december 2025 Bank Total risk-weighted requirement [1]  Total non-risk-weighted requirement [2]  Handelsbanken  26.29 6.00 SEB 27.22 6.00 Swedbank  27.40 6.00 Landshypotek 22.30 6.00 Länsförsäkringar 22.42 6.00 SBAB 22.00 6.00 Skandiabanken  21.66 6.00 Sparbanken Skåne 21.77 6.00 [1] Share of risk-weighted exposure amount (REA).  [2] Proportion of leverage ratio exposure (LRE). Note: For more information on how MREL is calculated, see the decision memorandum Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL), as well as the MREL policy (in Swedish). Table for all MREL and the Swedish systemically important banks.  Banks are to comply with EBA guidelines The EBA’s guidelines for improving resolvability for institutions and resolution authorities (EBA/GL/2022/01) entered into force on 1 January 2024. These guidelines are a key tool in the Debt Office’s assessment of the banks’ resolvability. Insufficient compliance with the guidelines can be grounds for the Debt Office to determine that there are substantive impediments to resolution. In 2025, the Debt Office has continued to evaluate the banks’ compliance with these guidelines. Although we have not identified any substantive impediments to resolution, there are nevertheless a number of areas in which further measures are needed in order to strengthen resolvability. https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/decisions-on-resolution-plans-for-2026/Fri, 19 Dec 2025 08:00:00 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q3-2025/The quarterly report also contains a section which describes the systemically important banks’ buffers against regulatory requirements. The purpose is to describe how much of the buffer of CET1 capital that is available to cover losses before the bank is in breach of a regulatory requirement or the Pillar 2 guidance. The report also demonstrates which regulatory requirement was the most restrictive at the end of the third quarter. The Debt Office makes decisions on MREL annually. Further information about MREL and its application for Swedish institutions is available in the Debt Office’s MREL policy and on our website. Report: Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) – Compliance Q3 2025https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q3-2025/Mon, 08 Dec 2025 08:00:00 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q2-2025/The quarterly report also contains a section which describes the systemically important banks’ buffers against regulatory requirements. The purpose is to describe how much of the buffer of CET1 capital that is available to cover losses before the bank is in breach of a regulatory requirement or the Pillar 2 guidance. The report also demonstrates which regulatory requirement was the most restrictive at the end of the second quarter. The Debt Office makes decisions on MREL annually. Further information about MREL and its application for Swedish institutions is available in the Debt Office’s MREL policy and on our website. The report Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) – Compliance Q2 2025https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q2-2025/Mon, 08 Sep 2025 08:00:00 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q1-2025/The quarterly report also contains a section which describes the systemically important banks’ buffers against regulatory requirements. The purpose is to describe how much of the buffer of CET1 capital that is available to cover losses before the bank is in breach of a regulatory requirement or the Pillar 2 guidance. The report also demonstrates which regulatory requirement was the most restrictive at the end of the first quarter. The Debt Office makes decisions on MREL annually. Further information about MREL and its application for Swedish institutions is available in the Debt Office’s MREL policy and on the Debt Office’s website. The report Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) – Compliance Q1 2025.  https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q1-2025/Fri, 11 Jul 2025 08:00:00 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/20252/esma-provides-guidance-on-a-tool-for-central-counterparty-resolution/The briefing, which is the first of its kind, was developed by ESMA’s CCP Resolution Committee. It provides a method that national resolution authorities may refer to when implementing the resolution tool known as a resolution cash call. According to the guidance, resolution authorities subject to the common EU regulatory framework are to define what data must be retrieved from a CCP for calibrating the resources that need to be made available through a cash call. In the event of this, the resolution authority should take into account the impact on various factors, such as clearing members and financial stability. Resolution authorities also need to ensure that processes are in place for executing cash calls, as well as regularly test that such processes function properly. The full report is available on ESMA’s website: CCP Resolution Briefing on the Operationalisation of resolution cash calls Read more about the Debt Office’s resolution tools for central counterpartieshttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/20252/esma-provides-guidance-on-a-tool-for-central-counterparty-resolution/Thu, 03 Jul 2025 16:25:00 GMTNewsFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/new-resolution-plan-for-central-counterparties-as-of-23-june/The new resolution plan will apply as of 23 June. The Debt Office is to prepare a resolution plan for central counterparties each year, on which the Resolution Board then decides. In Sweden, there is one central counterparty, Nasdaq Clearing Aktiebolag. The resolution plan describes, among other things, the strategies that the Debt Office intends to use in resolution as well as the Debt Office’s assessment of the central counterparty’s resolvability. The resolution plan is an important tool for being able to best carry out resolution if necessary.https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/new-resolution-plan-for-central-counterparties-as-of-23-june/Mon, 23 Jun 2025 08:00:00 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/20252/joint-approach-regarding-liquidity-support-in-bank-resolution/The Debt Office and the Riksbank both play important roles in safeguarding financial stability and will cooperate closely and constructively with each other in the event that a bank is put into resolution. It would be very costly for the economy if a systemically important bank were allowed to fail. The Swedish National Debt Office can therefore take control (but not take over ownership) of a failing systemically important bank and then restructure or transfer the business in an orderly manner. This procedure, known as resolution, restores the bank's viability. A necessary condition for the successful restructuring of a bank in resolution is that the bank is able to fund itself. The basic principle of the resolution procedure is that the bank's owners and lenders – not the taxpayers – continue to finance the bank. However, during a transitional phase, a bank in resolution may find it difficult to obtain sufficient liquidity on its own and may therefore need temporary liquidity support. Both the Debt Office and the Riksbank are authorised to grant such support. The Debt Office and the Riksbank have developed a joint approach to liquidity support for banks in resolution, which aims to make it clearer to market participants how the liquidity supply for a bank in resolution can be secured. "If a systemically important bank needs to be placed in resolution, both the Swedish National Debt Office and the Riksbank are ready to quickly take the measures required to maintain financial stability. Our joint approach to ensuring liquidity in resolution further strengthens this preparedness,” says Karolina Ekholm, Director General of the Swedish National Debt Office. “The Riksbank and the Swedish National Debt Office are prepared to act and cooperate in a crisis. Liquidity provision is central to successful crisis management. It is therefore positive for financial stability that we have developed an approach to provide liquidity to banks in resolution,” says Riksbank Governor Erik Thedéen. Document: Approach to liquidity provisionhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/20252/joint-approach-regarding-liquidity-support-in-bank-resolution/Mon, 02 Jun 2025 09:30:00 GMTNewsFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/20252/debt-office-in-joint-letter-to-eba-on-rulebook-for-banking-crisis-management/The Debt Office, together with the other resolution authorities in the Nordic region, has sent a joint letter to the EBA on the need for a banking crisis management rulebook that is more straightforward without jeopardising financial stability. The EU-wide Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) has improved the prospects for resolution authorities to manage banks in crisis. Nevertheless, the endeavour to create a comprehensive harmonised rulebook has led to a highly detailed and complex regulatory framework. The key message of the letter is that a more principal-based and risk-oriented framework with a lower level of detail would provide resolution authorities with better conditions for improving their operational readiness to manage banks in crisis, as well as direct resources towards the areas of greatest significance for financial stability. Read the letter in full: Nordic Resolution Authorities Letter on Simplification  https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/20252/debt-office-in-joint-letter-to-eba-on-rulebook-for-banking-crisis-management/Fri, 09 May 2025 08:59:00 GMTNewsFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q4-2024/The quarterly report now also contains a section which describes the systemically important banks’ buffers against regulatory requirements. The purpose is to describe how much of the buffer of CET1 capital that is available to cover losses before the bank is in breach of a regulatory requirement or the Pillar 2 guidance. The report also demonstrates which regulatory requirement was the most restrictive at the end of the fourth quarter. The Debt Office makes decisions on MREL annually. Further information about MREL and its application for Swedish institutions is available in the Debt Office’s MREL policy and on the Debt Office's website. The report Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) – Compliance Q4 2024.https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2025/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q4-2024/Thu, 06 Mar 2025 08:00:00 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/20252/adjustment-of-resolution-fees-for-2023/In the spring of 2024, the Debt Office discovered an error in the calculation model that is used to distribute the fee among those institutions that pay a risk-adjusted fee. The error stems from one of the risk indicators used in the calculation and led to 28 institutions paying a fee that was too high. In total, the incorrect fees amount to SEK 31,118,000. This corresponds to 0.77 per cent of the SEK 4.06 billion in total fees charged for 2023. For the institutions that will receive a repayment, the incorrect fee amounts to between 0.04 per cent and 14.16 per cent of their respective charged fee. The Debt Office takes this error very seriously, and the agency has therefore taken measures to both correct the error and make sure that it does not happen again. We have recalculated the fee for 2023 to ensure that the institutions that paid a fee that was too high will now have a portion of that fee repaid. We have also improved internal processes, procedures, and systems. As the incorrect fee is a small portion of the total fee charged, it neither affects the forthcoming fees nor the point in time at which the resolution reserve is expected to reach the target level. Today, the Debt Office contacted those institutions that will receive a repayment of funds. Read more about resolution feeshttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/20252/adjustment-of-resolution-fees-for-2023/Wed, 26 Feb 2025 13:40:08 GMTNewsFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2024/this-years-decisions-on-resolution-plans/The Swedish National Debt Office manages systemically important banks that have failed, or are at risk of failing, through resolution. If banks that are deemed systemically important were to be put into bankruptcy instead, the consequences for the financial system could be substantial. To be able to implement resolution, the Debt Office decides on MREL. These requirements are designed so that the banks’ shareholders and creditors – not taxpayers – are to bear the costs of crisis management. The banks have developed several aspects of their work, but there are also areas in which we have identified a need for further measures Since 1 January 2024, the systemically important banks must comply with the European Banking Authority’s (EBA) guidelines for resolvability as well. These guidelines are also intended to improve the feasibility of the Debt Office being able to carry out resolution. “The Debt Office continues to work actively in order to strengthen its capability of managing banks in crisis through resolution. Part of this effort is evaluating the banks’ internal capacity and capabilities. The banks have developed several aspects of their work, but there are also areas in which we have identified a need for further measures,” says Debt Office Director General Karolina Ekholm. The Debt Office deems eight banks to be systemically important. The eight systemically important banks and their MREL, 1 January 2025 Bank Total risk-weighted requirement1  Total non-risk-weighted requirement2  Handelsbanken  26.83 6.00 SEB 27.52 6.00 Swedbank  28.65 6.00 Landshypotek 22.30 6.00 Länsförsäkringar 22.70 6.00 SBAB 22.24 6.00 Skandiabanken  21.66 6.00 Sparbanken Skåne 22.11 6.00 1Proportion of REA.  2Proportion of LRE. Note: For more information on how MREL is calculated, see the decision memorandum Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) as well as the MREL policy (both in Swedish).  See the table for all MREL for the Swedish systemically important banks. Banks are to comply with the new EBA guidelines The EBA’s guidelines for improving resolvability for institutions and resolution authorities (EBA/GL/2022/01) entered into force on 1 January 2024. These guidelines are a key tool in the Debt Office’s assessment of the banks’ resolvability. Insufficient compliance with the guidelines can be grounds for the Debt Office to determine that there are substantive impediments to resolution. In 2024, the Debt Office has for the first time evaluated the banks’ compliance with the guidelines since they took effect. The Debt Office has not identified any substantive impediments to resolution. Nevertheless, the authority has identified a number of areas where measures must be taken in order to improve resolvability. Most banks are not deemed systemically important The majority of the banks for which the Debt Office conducts resolution planning are not deemed systemically important. The Debt Office is therefore planning for these to be wound up through bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings if they were to fail. For banks in this category, the Debt Office has made decisions on so-called simplified resolution plans and on MREL that does not exceed the capital requirements (investments firms are also included in this category). Deposit insurance always applies Regardless of how a bank in crisis is managed, deposit insurance applies. This means that the Debt Office pays out compensation to private individuals, companies, and other legal persons if a bank were to fail. Depositors’ money is protected up to the amount of SEK 1,050,000 per depositor and institution. Read more about the Resolution Board. https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2024/this-years-decisions-on-resolution-plans/Fri, 20 Dec 2024 08:00:00 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2024/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q3-2024/The Debt Office makes decisions on MREL annually. Further information about MREL and its application for Swedish institutions is available in the Debt Office’s MREL policy and on our website. The report Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) – Compliance Q3 2024https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/press-releases/2024/compliance-with-the-minimum-requirements-for-own-funds-and-eligible-liabilities--q3-2024/Fri, 29 Nov 2024 08:00:00 GMTPress releaseFinancial stabilityhttps://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/2024/nordic-baltic-crisis-simulation-exercise-2024/Nearly 450 participants took part in the exercise, representing authorities from Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden, as well as the relevant European Union authorities: European Commission, ECB, Single Resolution Board (SRB) and European Banking Authority (EBA). A staff member of the International Monetary Fund was also invited to participate as an observer. The purpose of the exercise was to test communication, information sharing and collaboration between the authorities during crisis management in a highly uncertain and time pressured environment. The exercise was designed in line with a crisis scenario where the fictitious banks went through three phases that could be foreseen in a bank crisis management process: 1) the transition from normal business to recovery including addressing liquidity issues, 2) the movement from recovery to resolution, with resolution authorities assuming control of the bank and 3) after resolution, the return of the restructured bank to the market. During the exercise, authorities applied the tools and powers at their disposal according to the EU regulatory framework for banking supervision and crisis management.  Following the successful conclusion of the exercise, authorities will document and share the lessons learnt, and will integrate them into their existing crisis management routines. This will strengthen their crisis preparedness and further enhance the crisis management framework in the Nordic-Baltic region. A preparation team established under the Nordic Baltic Stability Group (NBSG) and led by the Danish resolution entity Finansiel Stabilitet was formed in 2023 to prepare the exercise. The team was advised by Oliver Wyman in the preparation of the exercise. The NBSG consists of government ministries, central banks, supervisory authorities, and resolution authorities in the eight Nordic and Baltic countries. In the context of the NBSG, the Nordic and Baltic authorities have agreed to conduct regular financial crisis simulation exercises.  https://www.riksgalden.se/en/press-and-publications/press-releases-and-news/news/2024/nordic-baltic-crisis-simulation-exercise-2024/Fri, 20 Sep 2024 15:00:00 GMTNewsFinancial stability