


# Central government borrowing

Forecast and analysis 2025:2





## The Debt Office's assignment

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One of the Debt Office's areas of responsibility is to conduct government borrowing and manage the central government debt. The aim is to do this at the lowest possible cost over time while taking account of risk.

The Debt Office borrows to cover deficits in the central government budget (the net borrowing requirement) and to repay previously raised loans that are maturing. In *Central Government Borrowing – Forecast and Analysis*, we present forecasts of the budget balance and borrowing requirement for the coming two years as well as a borrowing plan. The report is published twice a year (in May and November).

On the fifth working day of each month, we publish the central government budget balance for the previous month. We compare the outcome with the forecast and explain any deviations. In connection with the monthly outcome, the Debt Office also presents the debt development in the report *Sweden's Central Government Debt*.

Between the forecasts, the Debt Office also continually communicates terms for forthcoming auctions of government securities and the results of the auctions.

Predictable and clear communication about the borrowing requirement and the supply of government securities is a key part of the Debt Office's borrowing strategy. This helps reduce investor uncertainty, thereby improving the conditions for lower borrowing costs for the central government.

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# Preface


In *Central Government Borrowing – Forecast and Analysis 2025:1*, the Debt Office presents forecasts for the Swedish economy, the central government's budget balance (net borrowing requirement) and debt for 2025–2027, as well as the Debt Office's borrowing plan for the period.

The economic outlook is presented in the first section, forming the foundation for the budget balance forecast and the debt development in the second section. The last section focuses on the Debt Office's borrowing plan and how it affects the composition and maturity of the central government debt.

The report takes into account developments up to 12 November 2025.

Karolina Ekholm  
Debt Office Director General

## The Debt Office funds the net borrowing requirement and maturing loans



Note: The dark grey part is covered in chapter 1, the blue parts in chapter 2, and the pink parts in chapter 3. The first two chapters describe the expected conditions for borrowing, whereas the last chapter is about how the Debt Office plans to respond to these conditions.

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## Summary

With a growing budget deficit expected for both 2026 and 2027, the Swedish central government will need to increase its borrowing. The Debt Office is therefore further raising the issuance volume of government bonds. The deficits lead to an increase in central government debt measured both in kronor and as a proportion of GDP.

The Debt Office's forecast shows budget deficits of SEK 103 billion for this year, SEK 173 billion in 2026, and SEK 194 billion in 2027. This is mainly due to expansionary fiscal policy. For the years 2025 and 2026, the deficit – net borrowing requirement – is now a total of SEK 94 billion larger than in the previous forecast from May. The year 2027 is included for the first time in the Debt Office forecast.

In the macro picture that forms the basis of the budget forecast, the Swedish economy grows by 0.9 per cent this year, then shifts up to 2.7 per cent in 2026 and 2.5 per cent in 2027. The economic recovery strengthens tax income, but this does not offset the effect of higher expenditure and reduced taxes on the budget balance.

The central government debt is expected to grow from SEK 1,151 billion at the end of 2024 to SEK 1,591 billion at the end of 2027, corresponding to an increase from 18 to 22 per cent of GDP. The general government debt (Maastricht measure) increases from 34 per cent to 38 per cent of GDP. This is still a low level from an international perspective.

In order to meet the growing borrowing requirement, the Debt Office is first increasing the issuance volume of nominal government bonds from SEK 6 billion to SEK 8 billion per auction from the beginning of 2026. In advance of the next *Central Government Borrowing* report, we will consider holding auctions more frequently. Irrespective of the number of auctions held is the planned annual volume SEK 216 billion. The plan contains, since previously, two introductions of new government bonds next year, one of which is a syndication of SEK 20 billion. Short-term borrowing is also set to increase, although to a lesser extent than the long-term borrowing.

**Table 1 Central government borrowing**

SEK billion

Debt instrument	Outcome 2024	Forecast 2025	25:1 2025	Forecast 2026	25:1 2026	Forecast 2027
Nominal government bonds	72	118	118	216	146	220
Inflation-linked bonds	9	6	6	6	6	6
Foreign currency bonds	21	41	39	19	19	19
T-bills, stock at year-end	113	173	160	250	183	243
Liquidity management, stock at year-end	134	134	141	142	189	132

Note: 25:1 refers to the previous forecast published in May 2025.

**Table 2 Planned issue volume of nominal government bonds over next six months**

SEK billion

<b>Maturity category</b>	<b>Nominal government bond</b>	<b>28 November 2025 – 28 May 2026</b>
10-year	SGB 1067 2.5% 15 Oct 36	32
10-year pre-issued	SGB 1067 2.5% 15 Oct 36	4
	SGB 1068 x.xx% 09 Feb 37	22
5-year	SGB 1062 0.125% 12 May 31	17.75
2-year	SGB 1060 0.75% 12 May 28	12
> 12-year	SGB 1064 1.375% 23 Jun 71	0.75
	SGB 1053 3.5% 30 Mar 39	2
Other maturities	SGB 1066 2.25% 11 May 35	6
	SGB 1065 1.75% 11 Nov 33	2
	SGB 1056 2.25% 01 Jun 32	5.5
<b>Total supply</b>		<b>104</b>

Note: The category of "Other maturities" includes bonds that were previously 10-year reference bonds and are not yet included in the 5- or 2-year categories. The planned supply of SGB 1068 includes a syndication of SEK 20 billion. The indicated volumes apply assuming that the auctions are fully allocated. The Debt Office will not compensate if any auction is cut, but will continue to issue according to the plan.

**Table 3 Central government finances**

SEK billion, unless otherwise stated

<b>Key figure</b>	<b>Outcome 2024</b>	<b>Forecast 2025</b>	<b>25:1 2025</b>	<b>Forecast 2026</b>	<b>25:1 2026</b>	<b>Forecast 2027</b>
Budget balance (with the opposite sign, the net borrowing requirement)	-104	-103	-93	-173	-89	-194
Central govt. debt	1 151	1 240	1 232	1 406	1 316	1 591
Central govt. debt (% of GDP)	18	19	19	21	19	22
General govt. debt (% of GDP)	34	35	35	37	35	38

Note: 25:1 refers to the previous forecast published in May 2025.

**Table 4 Swedish economy**

Annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated

<b>Key figure</b>	<b>Outcome 2024</b>	<b>Forecast 2025</b>	<b>25:1 2025</b>	<b>Forecast 2026</b>	<b>25:1 2026</b>	<b>Forecast 2027</b>
GDP growth	0.8	0.9	1.4	2.7	2.0	2.5
Unemployment (% of labour force)	8.4	8.7	8.7	8.4	8.4	7.8
CPI inflation	1.9	2.6	2.5	0.8	1.7	1.7

Note: 25:1 refers to the previous forecast published in May 2025.

Data for the figures in this report are published separately on riksgalden.se.

## Once delayed recovery is now near

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The recovery of the Swedish economy is finally taking hold. Growth will accelerate further in the coming years as increasing purchasing power and greater confidence boost household consumption. Due to the delay in the recovery, there is also some lag in the labour market. This means that payroll growth is weaker than in the previous assessment and adversely affects central government finances.

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Growth of the Swedish economy is accelerating. Households are the biggest driver, especially next year as expansionary fiscal policy and rising real wages increase consumption capacity. Consumer confidence has risen distinctly since the previous *Central Government Borrowing* report. Uncertainty about tariffs has eased and the economic effects have so far been less than were feared. Lower investment contributed to weak GDP development in the first half of the year though, so the recovery will occur from a lower level than in the assessment from May.

Increased economic activity will gradually affect the labour market in the form of rising employment, decreasing unemployment, and payroll growth. However, payroll growth has been weak this year, resulting in a revised-down forecast with an adverse effect on the budget balance. Nevertheless, the effects of the macro revisions account for a small portion of the total weakening of central government finances that the Debt Office foresees in the next chapter.

### International uncertainty dampens export demand

In the coming years, growth in the US slows down and remains low in the euro area. For Sweden, this development entails weak demand from other countries and slower export growth.

The impact on the global economy from the tariffs imposed by the US on the importation of goods from other countries has so far been smaller than most had feared in the spring. There is, however, a risk that this impact has not yet fully materialised. Trade increased significantly before the tariffs were imposed but has since levelled out. It takes time for companies to redirect their supply chains and adapt their prices.

It remains uncertain how high the tariff rates will be ahead, but the degree of uncertainty is generally lower than previously. This means that companies may adapt to the conditions at hand more easily. The situation could change depending on the outcome of the legal process in the US as to whether or not the tariffs have been imposed legally, which is currently underway.

Growth of the US economy has slowed and reaches approximately 2 per cent per year for the 2025–2027 period, according to National Institute of Economic Research's

latest forecast that we use (see table 15 in the appendix). The labour market has shown clear signs of weakness, not least in terms of employment growth. Inflation remains above the target, but it has not risen as much as was feared when the tariffs were introduced. The Federal Reserve (Fed) has lowered its policy rate twice, citing the weaker labour market.

In the euro area, growth was stronger than expected in the beginning of the year when export spiked, but it has since subsided. Not least the German economy, which has special significance for Sweden, has been weak. Defence initiatives and infrastructure contribute to keeping growth up in the euro area next year despite decreased export demand from the US. The trade agreement entered into between the US and EU calls for tariffs of 15 per cent for the majority of the EU's export products and entails higher prices on European products in the US market.

## Clearer signs that economy is picking up speed

The Swedish economy is starting to grow more rapidly again after three weak years. After a slow start this year, growth rose distinctly in the third quarter according to GDP indicators, and confidence indicators for households and companies have also risen. Further aid in periods ahead comes from fiscal policy that is more expansionary in 2026 with a focus on households. To date, higher tariffs have not had as much of an adverse impact as feared, but they nevertheless mean that foreign trade has a slightly negative contribution to growth in the forecast period. This growth is instead driven by domestic demand, resulting from among other things the expansionary economic policy.

**Table 5 GDP and its components in constant prices, forecast**

Percentage change

Variable	Outcome 2024	Forecast 2025	25:1 2025	Forecast 2026	25:1 2026	Forecast 2027
<b>GDP</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.5</b>
Household consumption	0.6	1.4	1.2	3.2	2.3	2.6
General govt. consumption	1.2	0.5	1.1	1.8	1.3	1.6
Gross fixed cap. formation	0.0	0.0	0.6	3.7	3.4	3.5
Changes in inventories <sup>1</sup>	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0
Exports	2.0	3.9	1.9	3.1	3.3	4.2
Imports	2.3	4.6	1.7	3.6	4.2	4.4
Net exports <sup>1</sup>	-0.1	-0.3	0.2	-0.2	-0.3	0.0
<b>GDP (calendar-adjusted)</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>2.2</b>

<sup>1</sup> Contribution to GDP growth, percentage points.

Note: 25:1 refers to the previous forecast.

Source: Statistics Sweden and the Debt Office.




Altogether, we assess that growth is expected to increase in periods ahead. GDP grows by 2.7 per cent next year and 2.5 per cent in 2027. Growth is revised up for 2026, driven mainly by household consumption but also public consumption and stronger investment. The way in which this affects the central government budget balance is described in the section “Macro revisions weigh on budget balance” on page 14.

## Indicators show increased confidence

The National Institute of Economic Research’s (NIER) Economic Tendency Survey rose in October for the fourth consecutive month and is just above the historical average for the first time since the summer of 2022. At the time of the previous *Central Government Borrowing* report, consumer confidence was in a sharply declining trend with the indicator showing a much weaker mood than usual. This trend has now reversed and consumer confidence has risen six months in a row and is approaching its usual level (see figure 1). It is primarily in regard to consumer durables purchases that the indicator shows a slightly weaker mood than usual.

Figure 1 Economic Tendency Indicator and consumer confidence



Source: NIER.

As a whole, the current level of the Economic Tendency Indicator is compatible with growth near the historical average of 2 per cent since the year 2000. Alternative measures of business confidence, such as purchasing managers’ indices (PMI) in the service sector show higher levels of optimism than the Economic Tendency Indicator.

## Household consumption drives growth

The economic recovery that has begun is driven mainly by household consumption, which has increased for five consecutive quarters. In periods ahead as well, households are the greatest contributor to growth.

Several factors are contributing to the upturn, the most important of which is that wages are once again increasing faster than prices. Real wages have started to recover from the sharp drop during the high-inflation years. Lower interest rates also help to strengthen purchasing power. Since the middle of last year, the Riksbank has reduced its policy rate from 4 per cent to the current 1.75 per cent, and mortgage rates have fallen.

Next year, tax cuts on electricity and food and grocery items, as well as an employment-tax credit, strengthen real household income and increase consumption capacity. The uncertainty about trade policy has abated and stock markets have risen since the spring. This may have contributed to consumption of durable goods rising again after several years of a weak trend. However, the responses in the Economic Tendency Survey indicate that households are choosing to save more than usual, and the balance between household saving and consumption is difficult to assess. As a whole, we have revised up consumption for both this year and 2026. In our assessment, growth in consumption subsides slightly in 2027 and is in line with the historical average.

### **Investment starts to grow again**

In the coming years, investment grows in line with the historical average. Given the tariff agreement between the US and the EU at the end of July, much of the uncertainty regarding tariffs, US sanctions, and supply chains has abated. At the same time, geopolitical uncertainty remains high.

The trend of recent years has been that the commodity industries' investment has risen whereas the service industries' investment has declined. The green transition and the expansion of data centres and energy systems is expected to continue to boost industrial investment. Housing investment, which fell by 40 per cent between 2022 and 2024, has remained approximately unchanged since then. The fact that the number of construction permits is rising while construction and funding costs have decreased indicates that a recovery is underway. The more optimistic view that households have of the economic trend may imply rising housing prices and an increase in construction. Easing of the rules for mortgages in Sweden in April 2026 may also make it easier for, among others, young people and first-time buyers to enter the market.

### **Defence expenditure boosts public consumption**

As a result of major defence initiatives, public consumption grows to above the historical trend in the coming years. Nato member countries have decided that defence expenditure will reach 3.5 per cent of GDP in the year 2030. For Sweden, this involves a major increase in defence expenditure that boosts both public consumption and public investment. A significant part of military equipment is imported from abroad, which means that the immediate impact on growth will not be quite as high. The government's ambition is for defence spending to reach 3.5 per cent of GDP no later than 2030.

Public consumption this year will be lower than in the last two years. One reason for this is that municipalities need to implement saving measures in the wake of the major cost increases resulting from the years of high inflation. The low birth rate also means there are fewer children in preschool and school, which decreases the need for staff.

## **Dampened export next year**

Export will subside next year, to then grow faster in 2027 as global growth accelerates. The relatively weak export trend in 2026 is evidenced by export stocks, for instance. The economic climate is also weak in important European export markets. Other indicators of the export order situation are low as well.

The defence build-up in Europe benefits export, but the defence industry's share of export is small. According to the Inspectorate of Strategic Products, export of military equipment amounts to SEK 15 billion for 2022, SEK 18 billion for 2023, and SEK 29 billion 2024. Accordingly, the share of total goods export has almost doubled from 0.8 per cent to 1.5 per cent in just two years.

The Swedish krona has appreciated distinctly this year, mainly against the US dollar and to a lesser extent the euro. Viewed from a longer-term perspective, this appreciation has shifted the recent years' depreciation of the krona – although, measured using the trade-weighted KIX index, the krona remains weaker than the average from 2000. This indicates that the krona's effect on export will be limited.

On the whole, the contribution to growth from net export is slightly negative in the forecast years. This is contrary to the historical pattern during periods of economic recovery in which foreign trade is usually an important driver.

## **Inflation soon falls below target**

Inflation for this year is low, mainly as a result of tax cuts and the krona's appreciation.

Inflation measured as CPIF has in recent months been approximately 3 per cent. The relatively rapid rate of increase in prices is due to a limited number of products and should not be interpreted as the start of a broader rise in inflation. Inflation during the year has been sustained by a sharp increase in food-and-grocery prices in the beginning of the year.

The Debt Office forecasts low inflation for 2026. The electricity-tax reduction in January and the 50-per cent reduction of VAT on foodstuffs in April will lower the rate of inflation by up to 0.9 percentage points. The VAT on foodstuffs accounts for the majority and reduces the rate of inflation by approximately 0.7 of a percentage point as of the spring and one year thereafter, presuming that the impact on prices from the VAT reduction fully materialises. We expect a normal basket effect next year, which will lead to a downward level shift per year.


The stronger krona together with lower commodities prices contributes to the lower inflation in the forecast years. The fact that the wage increases are high from

a historical perspective creates some cost pressure, but heavy competition and weak demand mean that companies have limited possibilities of passing this on to consumers. Inflation expectations are well in keeping with the Riksbank's inflation target of 2 per cent.

Altogether, CPIF inflation is below 1 per cent for a significant part of 2026, to then approach 2 per cent according to our forecast (see figure 2). The Riksbank uses market pricing for forecasts above the policy rate. CPIF inflation, which does not exclude the effects of changes in mortgage rates, follows a similar pattern and is lowest in mid-2026. CPI is important for the development of the price-base amount, which determines certain payment amounts in the transfer payment system.

**Figure 2 CPIF inflation**

Annual percentage change



Source: The Debt Office and Statistics Sweden.

## Labour market closely follows stronger economy

The weak cyclical trend of recent years has had a distinct impact on the labour market, but it recovers next year in connection with stronger demand in the economy. Unemployment therefore shifts downward in the forecast period after having increased for several years. Payroll growth has been slower this year, as a result of a lower number of hours worked, but it picks up as the labour market improves in the coming years (see table 6).

**Table 6 Labour market and wages**

Percentage change

Labour market and wages	Outcome 2024	Forecast 2025	25:1 2025	Forecast 2026	25:1 2026	Forecast 2027
Unemployment <sup>1</sup>	8.4	8.7	8.7	8.4	8.4	7.8
Employment	-0.5	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.7	1.5
Labour force	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.8
Payroll	3.8	3.2	4.0	4.6	4.6	4.8

Labour market and wages	Outcome 2024	Forecast 2025	25:1 2025	Forecast 2026	25:1 2026	Forecast 2027
Hours worked <sup>2</sup>	-0.3	-0.4	0.2	1.1	1.0	1.5
Hourly wage, NA <sup>3</sup>	3.9	3.5	3.8	3.4	3.6	3.2
Hourly wage, NMO	4.1	3.6	3.7	3.4	3.6	3.2

<sup>1</sup> Per cent of labour force.

<sup>2</sup> Calendar-adjusted values.

<sup>3</sup> Hourly wages in the NA are calculated as the ratio of payroll and the number of hours worked.

Source: The National Mediation Office, the Debt Office, and Statistics Sweden.

## Early signs of improvement in labour market

No major changes have occurred in the labour market since the assessment in May, but some positive signs can be identified. The number of notices of redundancy have decreased slightly and the number of employed that are affected by bankruptcies is down to low levels. In addition, the number of those with temporary employment has increased and may provide a sign of forthcoming improvement in the entire labour market. A break in the trend for those registered as unemployed at the Swedish Public Employment Agency can also be seen already. The economy must improve, however, in order for demand for labour to increase. Neither employment plans in the Economic Tendency Survey nor the number of available employment positions through the Swedish Public Employment Agency show a notably stronger demand in the short term.

## Employment increases from high levels

Even though employment has gone down since the peak in 2023, the level remains high from a historical perspective. The weakening of the labour market is above all in regard to unemployment and this time mainly due to record-high participation in the labour force, as opposed to people being forced to leave their jobs. The increased inflow to the labour force mainly consists of young people. Typically, some also leave the labour force for studies during weak periods in the economy, but this has occurred to a lesser extent this time.

The economic activity has shrunk more than employment has, thereby freeing up companies' resources somewhat. When the economy strengthens, companies will first increase resource utilisation in the form of the number of hours worked before then increasing staff. In our assessment, employment will rise more distinctly next year and accelerate further in 2027. The labour force will also increase, although at a slower rate.


## Unemployment shifts downwards

Despite high employment, unemployment is also high. The increase in recent years has mostly been in regard to people with a post-secondary education. A high level of education among the unemployed creates the conditions for a more rapid recovery when demand for labour rises. As employment growth accelerates, and increases more than the labour force, unemployment will drop at a higher rate.

Towards the end of the forecast period, we approach the levels from before the decrease that started in the beginning of 2023 (see figure 3).

### Figure 3 Unemployment

Per cent of labour force, 15–74 years and 16–65 years, respectively



Note: Quarterly and seasonally adjusted data. LFS is the Labour Force Survey and PES is the Swedish Public Employment Service.

Source: The Swedish Public Employment Service, the Debt Office, and Statistics Sweden.

### Payroll grows with lag

In the first half of the year, payroll growth has remained dampened and is now growing more slowly than the historical average, which affects the trend for the full year 2025. In the forecast, growth will pick up, but this happens from a lower level than in the May assessment, which is also the case for the remainder of the forecast period.

The strength of the labour market largely determines the variation in payroll growth in the short term. Lower number of hours worked has contributed to the declining growth rate, and when the labour market gains strength, it will also drive up payroll growth. The wage formation mark for the central wage agreement in industry provides predictability about the hourly wage trend until the spring of 2027. Hourly wages continue to increase strongly, but the rate is decreasing and thereby holding back the otherwise increasing payroll growth in 2026 and 2027.

### Macro revisions weigh on budget balance

As a whole, the Debt Office's revisions of the macroeconomic trend affect the forecast of central government finances negatively. The contribution is, however, small in relation to the overall weakening central government finances that we foresee, which is described in further detail in the next chapter.

The most apparent effect on the budget balance comes from the weaker payroll growth. For the budget balance, GDP and its components in current prices are also

of significance. Compared with the assessment in May, we expect the real economy to develop more strongly, but a lower price level limits the revision in current prices. This is clear when it comes to consumption, which has been revised insignificantly in current prices (see table 7).

**Table 7 GDP and its components in current prices**

Percentage change

Variable	Outcome 2024	Forecast 2025	25:1 2025	Forecast 2026	25:1 2026	Forecast 2027
GDP	3.9	2.7	2.4	4.3	3.8	4.7
Household consumption	3.4	4.1	3.8	4.1	4.2	4.3
General govt. consumption	4.4	2.4	1.8	4.9	4.9	4.8
Gross fixed cap. formation	2.6	1.3	0.8	4.1	3.6	5.0
Changes in inventories <sup>1</sup>	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0
Exports	2.2	0.9	-1.8	2.0	2.9	5.0
Imports	2.1	2.1	-1.7	1.9	3.8	4.9

<sup>1</sup> Contribution to GDP growth, percentage points.

Note: 25:1 refers to the previous forecast.

Source: Statistics Sweden and the Debt Office.

## Risk of further postponement in recovery

The general economic development depends for the most part on the consumption trend. If economic activity does not increase as in the forecast, the recovery in the labour market will be even further delayed, and thereby so will payroll growth in the long run.

High inflation over an extended period can have a lasting effect (“scarring”) whereby households are more cautious, for instance to restore their savings buffers. Even though real wages are now rising, this is from a low level, which may mean that households prioritise saving despite the increase in consumption capacity (see the In-Depth section “Low purchasing power has delayed recovery”).

In addition to the domestic factors, the trend is also affected by the global situation. Uncertainty in relation to trade policy has subsided, but the geopolitical risk remains high. Conflicts in various parts of the world may spill over to financial markets, resulting in confidence and growth effects.

Many countries foresee an increased borrowing requirement, often from already high levels. If the sustainability of central government finances in, for example, the US and France were to be in question, it could lead to a sudden re-pricing of risk, a rise in long-term interest rates, as well as the spread of financial turmoil via global bond markets. Sweden’s central government finances are in good standing, but

small export-dependent economies as ours are affected by international developments.

## In-depth

### Low purchasing power has delayed recovery

The Debt Office and many other assessors have long expected an economic recovery driven by household consumption – but consumption has instead been relatively unchanged in real terms in recent years. We have therefore conducted a more thorough review of some factors affecting consumption to find explanations for the weak development so far. In addition, we have found support for our current forecast but also identified factors indicating that the risk of a further postponed recovery cannot be ruled out completely.

### Income trend is important factor for consumption

There are several measures of income and they vary in correlation with consumption in different ways. The growth of *real wages*<sup>1</sup> precedes growth of consumption, so this correlation is strongest when consumption growth is compared with the rate of real wage increases a few quarters prior. Among measures of income, this characteristic is unique and make this valuable from a forecast perspective. The significance of interest expenses for households is illustrated by a stronger correlation between real wages and consumption when wages are adjusted for CPI instead of CPIF (see figure 4).

*Real disposable income* is a broader measure whereby those that are not wage earners are included and income is measured after tax and various types of transfer payments. Since real disposable income can vary significantly between quarters, the connection between growth of this measure and consumption is generally weaker than it is for real wages. With this connection, growth of consumption furthermore tends to precede real disposable income rather than the other way around. The level of real disposable income tends, however, to be in line with consumption over time. The rate of *payroll growth* correlates well with growth of consumption, but payroll growth also lags behind consumption.


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<sup>1</sup> Nominal wages for inflation according to the CPI, which is described by Statistics Sweden as a cost-of-living index. The effects from household interest expenses are included in this measure and thereby the effect of the Riksbank's monetary policy.



**Figure 4 Correlations between real consumption and income in different periods**

Range -1 to 1



Note: The correlations are based on the annual percentage change in each income measure compared with real consumption growth in the period 0 for the years 2000–2019. Negative period refers to growth of the income measure prior to consumption and vice versa when positive.


Source: The National Mediation Office, the Debt Office, and Statistics Sweden.

### Continued low purchasing power has dampened consumption

Since the pandemic, the nominal rate of wage increase has been high from a historical perspective, but even higher inflation has led to a clear decrease in real wages and eroded the purchasing power of wage earners to the level of 10 years ago (see figure 5). This has dampened consumption, which has remained essentially unchanged in recent years. Consequently, wage earners' consumption currently makes up a larger share of wages than previously. In this respect, it is not surprising that consumption has not recovered more and could instead justify even lower consumption. Real disposable income has largely developed in line with consumption in the 2020s, in accordance with the historical connection.

**Figure 5 Real wages, disposable income, and consumption**

Index, 2019=100



Note: Statistics up to and including Q2 2025. Seasonally adjusted values in level. The last four outcomes of real wages are preliminary and subject to change once the statistics become more definitive.

Source: The National Mediation Office and Statistics Sweden.

## Consumption is affected by several factors other than wages

Even before 2019, consumption developed stronger than real wages, which is a testament to the effect being due to several factors. One of these is the number of hours worked, which has seen a weak development in recent years. Another is the increased job tax credit, which, together with other tax relief and increased investment income, has contributed to higher real disposable income but not affected real wages.

In the 2020s, households' propensity for saving has also been higher. The pandemic made consumption difficult, which led to increased saving. When inflation rose rapidly at the end of 2021, the worsened purchasing power was initially offset by many making use of their financial buffers. When purchasing power started to rise, households prioritised rebuilding their buffers rather than consuming, which is evident in the high degree of saving in relation to disposable income. In addition, households may be scarred by the cost shock of recent years and have a greater need of a buffer than previously. With higher interest rates, the incentive to pay off loans has risen. This means that households so far during the 2020s have reduced their debt as a proportion of disposable income for the first time since the 1990s. When households spend less, even higher real-income increases are required before consumption can increase.

## Growing budget deficits

The central government's budget deficits will grow next year and in 2027 compared with this year. Compared with the previous forecast, the deficit will be slightly larger in 2025 and much more so in 2026. Next year, this is mainly due to fiscal policy measures. The size of the deficits means that the central government debt as a proportion of GDP increases by four percentage points in the forecast period.

This year will be the second consecutive year of a central government budget deficit. A weak economy as well as tax cuts have led to slow growth in tax income at the same time as expenditure continues to increase in 2025. The deficits increase next year and further in 2027. This is largely due to fiscal policy measures that the Government is implementing. The measures entail considerable spending increases and also tax cuts. The increase in expenditure for defence and aid to Ukraine is financed outside of the regular fiscal policy framework but nevertheless affects the central government budget and debt. In 2027, the Debt Office's net lending and interest on central government debt also increase. As a whole, this means that the budget deficits increase further in the forecast period. The recovery in the economy causes tax income to increase more rapidly, but in the short term this cannot compensate for spending increases and tax cuts.

**Table 8 Central government budget balance**

SEK billion

Central government budget balance	Outcome 2024	Forecast 2025	25:1 2025	Forecast 2026	25:1 2026	Forecast 2027
Primary balance <sup>1</sup>	-76	-69	-60	-125	-53	-124
Debt Office's net lending	-8	-3	-2	-23	-14	-38
Interest on central government debt <sup>2,3</sup>	-21	-31	-31	-25	-23	-33
<b>Budget balance</b>	<b>-104</b>	<b>-103</b>	<b>-93</b>	<b>-173</b>	<b>-89</b>	<b>-194</b>
Central government net lending	-71	-94	-73	-168	-88	-161

<sup>1</sup> The primary balance is the net of income and expenditure excluding interest payments and Debt Office net lending.

<sup>2</sup> Debt Office net lending mainly consists of the net of government agencies' loans and deposits in the central government's internal bank.

<sup>3</sup> The table shows Debt Office net lending and the interest on central government debt in terms of how they affect the budget balance. The signs are therefore the opposite of those shown in Tables 9 and 10.


Note: 25:1 refers to the previous forecast.

Source: The Debt Office and Statistics Sweden.

The new forecast shows a budget deficit for the central government of SEK 103 billion in 2025, SEK 173 billion in 2026 and SEK 194 billion in 2027 (see figure 6). For the years 2025 and 2026, the new forecasts entail a downward revision of the budget balance by SEK 94 billion in total. This results in a correspondingly large increase in the central government net borrowing requirement. This is the Debt Office's first forecast for 2027.

**Figure 6 Central government budget balance 2018–2027**

SEK billion



Source: The Debt Office.


The budget-balance trend and the Debt Office's forecasts are primarily influenced by:

- trends in the Swedish economy and labour market (see the previous chapter)
- fiscal policy presented in the Government's budgets and our assumptions on future fiscal policy (see the Facts section on page 21)
- large one-time payments (such as EU payments)
- inflows and outflows included in the item Debt Office net lending (such as government agencies' investments, and on-lending).

As a whole, the outcomes of the budget balance between May and October have been slightly higher than we had calculated. Individual monthly outcomes have, however, deviated more from the forecast, which among other things has been due to variations in the Debt Office's net lending between months. In the Debt Office's new forecast, the budget balance is lower than in the forecast from May, mainly for next year. This is mostly due to increased expenditure as well as tax cuts that are proposed in the Budget Bill for 2026. The macroeconomic revisions have a slightly negative effect on tax income. Figure 7 shows how the forecast change for the budget balance is distributed among the parts. The revisions for each area are explained in further detail in the next section.

Figure 7 Forecast changes, effects on budget balance

SEK billion



Note: The figure shows changes in the budget balance. A positive amount means that the budget balance is strengthened, whereas a negative amount means that it is weakened.

Source: The Debt Office.

## Fiscal policy dampens tax income

Tax cuts and the weak economy has dampened the increase in the central government's tax income this year. In the coming years, the economic trend contributes to tax income rising more, although lower than it would have been without the tax reductions (see table 17 in the appendix). Compared with the May forecast, we are revising down tax income mainly as a result of the tax cuts presented in the Budget Bill for 2026.

### Facts

## What are the types of government tax income?

The Debt Office divides central government tax income into payroll tax, consumption tax, corporate tax, and supplementary tax. The different types of tax are briefly described below.

- Payroll tax consists of the sum of preliminary "A-tax" (PAYE income tax deducted by the employer) and employer's contributions excluding fees for the old-age pension system and disbursements of municipal tax. Payroll (the gross wage sum) affects payroll tax through preliminary "A-tax" and employer's contributions. Local and regional governments receive preliminary amounts as disbursements of municipal tax from the central government. When income for a calendar year is established two years later, the difference against the preliminary disbursements is settled in a one-time payment (final settlement).

- Consumption tax mainly comprises value-added tax (VAT) and excise duties. These are affected by household consumption and investment.
- Corporate tax comprises among other things taxes that companies pay, particularly payroll tax and yield tax, which is a tax on pension and endowment insurance.
- Supplementary tax consists mainly of the net of incoming and outgoing payments for tax accounts, and where the charge is not debited continually. This concerns the flows as a result of deficits and surpluses in conjunction with tax assessment, but it can for instance also be in the form of capital placements in tax accounts.

The largest source of tax income for the central government is from consumption tax, which accounts for approximately 50 per cent of total income from taxes. The smallest contribution is from supplementary tax. Supplementary tax is, however, volatile, which means that it often has a distinct effect on forecast revisions.

## Income from taxes increases between years

The increase in tax income is mainly due to consumption tax and corporate tax income rising in the forecast period. Payroll-tax income, however, slows down next year but rises again in 2027.

Income from preliminary “A-tax” and employer’s contributions increases slightly this year and decreases in 2026. The dampened progression this year is the result of tax cuts and moderate payroll growth. In 2026 and 2027, income from payroll tax is burdened mainly by reduced tax on earned income, pension, and sickness and activity compensation as well as temporarily reduced employer’s contributions for the 19–23 age group.

Income from consumption tax continues to rise in the coming years. Tax income from VAT increases as a result of the higher economic activity. However, the temporarily reduced VAT on foodstuffs means that the increase is not as large as it would have been otherwise. Income from excise duties are revised up for both this year and the next. The lower levels are due to regulatory changes, mainly the reduction in electricity tax as of 2026. This offsets the effect of the increase in household consumption. In 2027, income from excise duties increases again.

There is only a slight increase in income from corporate tax this year, but it speeds up somewhat in the coming two years. Tax on corporate profits is the main driver of the development between the years.

Income from supplementary tax has developed strongly since 2021. The increase has evened out though in the last two years, and the level remains essentially unchanged.


## Forecast for tax income is revised down

The forecast of the central government's income from taxes is revised down by SEK 4 billion this year and SEK 50 billion for 2026. It is above all income from wage tax and consumption tax that is lower in the new forecast. The majority of the downward revision is the result of tax cuts proposed in the Budget Bill for 2026, but the weaker payroll growth also has an adverse effect.

The forecasts for supplementary tax and corporate tax are relatively unchanged for both this year and next year. Supplementary tax also includes capital placements in tax accounts. The Swedish National Financial Management Authority (ESV) assesses that these amounted to SEK 51 billion in total at the end of 2024 and will remain unchanged this year. This is in line with the trend for tax account balances, which we use as an indicator of the scale of capital placements (see figure 8). Based on the relatively unchanged total balance in tax accounts, we are retaining our assumption for unchanged capital placements throughout the forecast period.

**Figure 8 Total balance, tax accounts**

SEK billion



Note: The total balance primarily consists of deposits in order to cover forthcoming tax payments, as well as capital placements. It is, however, not possible to determine what proportion is capital placements. The figure shows the twelve-month moving average.

Source: The Debt Office and the Swedish Tax Agency.

## Increased expenditure during forecast period

The central government's primary expenditure continues to increase in 2026 and 2027. This is mainly due to fiscal policy measures in the Budget Bill for 2026. Incoming payments from the EU facility to boost recovery in member states after the pandemic are defined as negative expenditures and have a dampening effect on expenditure this year and in 2026. We are revising up the forecast of primary expenditure for both this year and 2026 mainly as a result of higher expenditure for the aid to Ukraine and Swedish defence build-up.

## Facts

### Primary expenditure illuminates underlying trend

Primary expenditure is how the Debt Office defines the central government's expenditure that is not interest or Debt Office net lending. The intention is to show the underlying expenditure trend. In primary expenditure, certain types of income are deducted. This is income that is not from taxes, dividends, or the sale of government assets. EU grants are one such example. In other words, these entail lower primary expenditure.

### Aid to Ukraine and defence spending increase expenditure

Central government primary expenditure increases this year, mainly in relation to defence (defence build-up and aid to Ukraine). However, expenditure for the EU fee is also higher (see table 17 in the appendix).

Within the framework of the EU facility, the European Commission on 18 July 2025 paid out SEK 18.5 billion to Sweden. The payment is part of the aid from the EU-wide initiative to boost recovery in member states after the pandemic. Incoming payments from the EU facility are deducted from primary expenditure and thereby have a dampening effect. In total, Sweden's part of the EU facility encompasses approximately SEK 35 billion and the remaining amount is expected to be paid out in 2026.

Central government primary expenditure continues to increase in 2026 and 2027, mainly as a result of measures in the Budget Bill for 2026.

For 2026, this primarily concerns increased expenditure for military aid to Ukraine and the Swedish defence build-up. The Government proposes that the previous framework for military aid to Ukraine be increased to SEK 40 billion in 2026 and extended to 2027. In the forecast, we have chosen to evenly distribute the expenditure under the framework over the coming three years. On the basis of this assumption, the central government's budget is burdened by approximately SEK 27 billion in 2026 and 2027, which is a lower annual burden than in the Government's assumption. Expenditure also increases in other areas such as transport where it rises as a result of the infrastructure bill that was previously decided on. The expected incoming payment from the EU facility in 2026 means, however, that primary expenditure will be around SEK 16 billion lower than it would have been otherwise.

For 2027, spending for the Swedish military continues to increase. The military aid to Ukraine remains, however, at the same level as in 2026, which means the increase will not be as extensive. Expenditure within the legal system and transport also continues to increase. Our assumption of unfunded fiscal policy measures of SEK 15 billion also increases the expenditure level (see the In-depth section below).



## In-depth

### Assumptions regarding fiscal policy

The fiscal policy in the Debt Office's forecast is based on the proposals and announcements in the Budget Bill for 2026 as well as an assumption of further unfunded fiscal policy measures for 2027.

The Budget Bill for 2026 contains unfunded measures of SEK 127 billion in total for 2026. Just over SEK 50 billion of the measures lower tax income, including reduced tax on labour and pensions, temporarily reduced VAT on foodstuffs, reduced electricity tax, and a temporary reduction in employer's contributions for young people. On the expenditure side, the measures mainly consist of additional defence funding and support to Ukraine as well as, for instance, increased resources for schools and preschools and healthcare.

In the Budget Bill for 2026, the financial framework for military aid to Ukraine was expanded to amount to SEK 40 billion per year for 2026 and 2027. Even though the framework for the aid is set per calendar year, the Debt Office assumes that the burden on the central government budget will, as previously, be spread out over a longer period. The way in which the aid will weigh on the budget balance depends on how the aid is designed and decided on. We have chosen to spread out the aggregate aid of SEK 80 billion in our forecast over three years. Accordingly, our forecast for how the aid burdens the budget balance is approximately SEK 27 billion per year for the 2026–2028 period, of which 2028 is beyond our forecast horizon.

The Budget Bill contains a proposed lending framework of SEK 220 billion at the 2026 price level for investment costs for new nuclear power in the 2026–2045 period. Based on the Budget Bill, we assume that lending for investment in new nuclear power will be approximately SEK 1 billion for 2026 and SEK 1 billion for 2027. The majority of the lending within the framework is allocated outside of our forecast horizon.

For 2027, we have made an assumption of SEK 15 billion in unfunded fiscal policy measures. For calculation purposes, the measures are entered as expenditures, but they should not be interpreted as a forecast of how they will be distributed by the Riksdag or as the Debt Office's view of how they should be distributed.

### Forecast for expenditure is revised up

Compared with the previous forecast, we are revising up primary expenditure by SEK 4 billion for this year and SEK 21 billion next year.

The higher primary expenditure is mainly due to revised-up defence spending. The size of the revision is offset by the fact that in the May forecast we, calculation-wise, put our entire assumption of unfunded fiscal policy measures on the

expenditure side. We have also revised down expenditure slightly for certain areas such as the legal system and transport as a result of a lower outcome than in the May forecast. In addition, the EU fee is revised up for 2025 but revised down for 2026.

## Debt Office net lending affects balance negatively

Net lending by the Debt Office to agencies and other parties had an adverse effect on the budget balance in 2024 and will continue to do so this year. In the coming years, net lending by the Debt Office is expected to increase significantly and have a negative effect on the budget balance. The net lending forecast remains largely unchanged for this year but is revised up for next year (see table 9).

In recent years, net lending by the Debt Office has had a major impact on the budget balance's progression. This is due in part to Svenska kraftnät's deposits at the Debt Office having been unusually high since 2022 as a result of extensive revenue from congestion rent. In 2023, Svenska kraftnät's deposits decreased as congestion revenue was used to finance electricity price support to households and businesses. Last year, net lending had a smaller overall effect on the budget balance's development than in previous years. At the same time, several factors contributed to major flows in both the Debt Office's deposits and lending. Net lending was kept down by Svenska kraftnät's congestion revenue being at a historically high level. The Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) also increased its deposits at the Debt Office during the year, as a result of international collaborations focusing on aid to Ukraine. Additionally, FMV reduced its lending with the Debt Office, which further contributed to lower net lending. At the same time, several factors contributed to increased net lending, such as outflows in connection with the Deposit Guarantee Fund, the Swedish Transport Administration, and the Swedish Board of Student Finance (CSN).

This year, net lending by the Debt Office appears to have a continued small overall effect on the budget balance. Svenska kraftnät's congestion revenue has remained at a high level and FMV has continued to increase its balance with the Debt Office. The effect of this has been offset by increased lending to the Swedish Transport Administration, CSN, and the Swedish Fortifications Agency, as well as the Swedish Pensions Agency having reduced its balance with the Debt Office.

In coming years, net lending by the Debt Office is expected to have a greater adverse effect on the budget balance. Svenska kraftnät plans to begin implementing more extensive grid investments that are largely financed by congestion revenue. This contributes to the public enterprise's deposits at the Debt Office decreasing and the net lending thereby increasing and weighing on the budget balance in both 2026 and 2027. FMV is also expected to reduce its deposits at the Debt Office in the coming years. Furthermore, the Debt Office expects lending to CSN to increase as more student loans are paid out.

Compared with the May forecast, the net lending is unchanged for this year and SEK 9 billion higher for next year. The revisions for next year are primarily due to new assessments regarding FMV's deposits at the Debt Office.

**Table 9 Debt Office's net lending**

SEK billion

<b>The Debt Office's net lending to agencies and other parties</b>	<b>Outcome 2024</b>	<b>Forecast 2025</b>	<b>25:1 2025</b>	<b>Forecast 2026</b>	<b>25:1 2026</b>	<b>Forecast 2027</b>
Lending to CSN (the Swedish Board of Student Finance)	15	17	17	18	18	18
Lending to the Swedish Transport Administration	8	2	3	2	2	2
Lending to outside the government <sup>1</sup>	-2	0	0	0	0	0
On-lending to the Riksbank	3	3	3	1	1	1
Other lending <sup>2</sup>	4	14	8	11	8	11
<b>Total lending</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>32</b>
Deposits from CSN, credit reserve, etc.	1	1	2	4	4	4
Deposits from the Resolution Reserve	7	6	6	6	6	2
Deposits from Premium pension, net <sup>3</sup>	6	-6	-1	0	1	0
Deposits from outside the government <sup>4</sup>	-4	-1	4	0	1	0
Other lending	9	34	18	-2	2	-12
<b>Total lending</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>-6</b>
<b>Net lending</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>Net lending excluding on-lending<sup>5</sup></b>	<b>5</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>37</b>

<sup>1</sup> Lending to outside the government refers to lending in SEK to actors outside the realm of government agencies, such as state-owned companies.

<sup>2</sup> Lending and deposits to Svenska kraftnät is included in the "Other" category.

<sup>3</sup> Premium pension refers to the net of paid-in pension fees and disbursement of funds, and other administrative costs.

<sup>4</sup> Deposits from outside the government refers to deposits from actors outside the realm of government agencies, such as the EU account.

<sup>5</sup> On-lending includes the Debt Office's lending to the Riksbank as well as other non-governmental parties.

Note: 25:1 refers to the previous forecast.

Source: The Debt Office.

## Facts

### Debt Office net lending – a special expenditure item

Net lending by the Debt Office to government agencies and other parties is an item on the expenditure side of the central government budget. When net lending increases, the budget balance becomes weaker. This means that the net borrowing requirement increases. The net lending is not financed by appropriations and does not come under the so-called expenditure ceiling. It consists of the change in all


lending and depositing in the central government's internal bank at the Debt Office. The net lending pertains to areas within the central government's continual operations – such as disbursements of student loans, deposits in the premium pension system, and lending to infrastructure investments – as well as items such as on-lending to non-governmental parties. As these items may be decided on short notice, the net lending can vary significantly from year to year.

## Gradual effect on interest payments

The Debt Office expects interest payments of SEK 31 billion this year, SEK 25 billion next year, and SEK 33 billion in 2027 (see figure 9 and table 10). The fact that the interest payments are expected to be slightly lower in 2026 than in 2025 is mainly due to the Debt Office receiving larger interest payments for net lending by the Debt Office to other agencies etc. next year compared with this year. The increase in total interest payments in 2027 is a result of the increased borrowing gradually taking effect. In all three forecast years, the Debt Office pays out inflation compensation for inflation-linked bonds that are maturing.

**Figure 9 Interest payments 2018-2027**

SEK billion



Source: The Debt Office.

Compared with the forecast from May, interest payments are essentially unchanged this year but 2 billion higher next year. The upward revision for 2026 is due to increased borrowing.

The Debt Office uses implicit forward interest rates in calculating forecasts of the central government's interest payments. The calculation was made using yield curves from 31 October 2025. For the calculation of exchange rate effects, we use cut-off rates from the same date.

**Table 10 Interest on central government debt**

SEK billion

<b>Interest on central government debt</b>	<b>Outcome 2024</b>	<b>Forecast 2025</b>	<b>25:1 2025</b>	<b>Forecast 2026</b>	<b>25:1 2026</b>	<b>Forecast 2027</b>
Interest on loans in SEK	19	31	31	26	24	33
Interest on loans in foreign currency	2	0	0	0	0	0
Realised currency gains and losses	-1	0	-1	-2	-2	0
<b>Sum of interest on government debt</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>33</b>

Note: 25:1 refers to the previous forecast.

Source: The Debt Office.


## Central government debt increases

The budget deficit causes the central government debt to increase in the coming years. The way in which the budget balance – affects the size of the debt is shown in table 19 in the appendix.

At the end of 2024, the central government debt was SEK 1,151 billion, which corresponds to 18 per cent of GDP. The Debt Office expects the debt to increase to SEK 1,240 billion for 2025, SEK 1,406 billion for 2026, and SEK 1,591 billion for 2027 (see figure 10 below and table 19 in the appendix). This means that the central government debt will reach 22 per cent of GDP by the end of 2027.

In the Debt Office's assessment, the general government debt, also called the Maastricht debt, rises from 34 per cent of GDP in 2024 to 38 per cent at the end of the forecast period. Central government debt accounts for most of the increase. This measure of the consolidated gross debt for the general government is used in international comparisons and the fiscal policy framework (see the Facts section "Different ways to measure government debt" below). The debt anchor in the framework is a Maastricht debt of 35 per cent of GDP ( $\pm 5$  percentage points).

Figure 10 Central government debt - development over time



Source: The Debt Office and Statistics Sweden.

## Facts

### Different ways to measure government debt

- **Unconsolidated central government debt:** The measure is used in the Debt Office's reporting and shows the total gross debt for the central government. It includes all loans raised by the Debt Office on behalf of the central government, irrespective of who owns the debt. The debt is reported at its nominal terminal value, according to EU principles.
- **Consolidated central government debt:** Some government agencies own government bonds and treasury bills, which are deducted from the consolidated central government debt (with the exception of the Riksbank's holdings). This measure provides an overall picture of the financial position of the central government and is used in the Government's Budget Bill and the annual report for the central government. The Swedish National Financial Management Authority is responsible for calculating this measurement.
- **The Maastricht debt:** This is the international measure used for comparison, which measures the consolidated gross debt for the general government sector including local and regional governments and the national pension system. The statistics agency Statistics Sweden publishes this measurement. According to EU regulations, the Maastricht debt must not exceed 60 per cent of GDP. In Sweden, the Riksdag has set the target for the debt – called the debt anchor – at 35 per cent of GDP.

## Risks to the budget balance

The way in which the economy develops is of great significance to the progression of the budget balance and central government debt. A worse or better state of the economy than in the forecast normally affects tax income more than expenditures, which are usually easier for the central government to control.

The budget balance is also often affected by payments of a temporary nature and which may be large. Examples of this are aid to Ukraine, incoming payments of congestion revenue to Svenska kraftnät, grid investments from Svenska kraftnät, and incoming payments from the EU's Recovery and Resilience Facility. To varying degrees, both the amounts and timing are uncertain and may deviate from our forecast.

Sweden has pledged to adhere to Nato's new targets for defence spending as a proportion of GDP. There is uncertainty in regard to the rate at which the defence spending will increase and when it will burden the central government budget. It is the Debt Office's assessment that this uncertainty is nevertheless greater beyond this forecast horizon.

## Increased government bond supply

In light of the growing budget deficits, the Debt Office is continuing to increase the supply of government bonds. We will raise the issuance volume in the auctions as of the turn of the year and, as previously announced, introduce two new nominal government bonds in 2026. As for treasury bills, issuance will also increase and we will start using single-price auctions.

The new budget balance forecast and the need to refinance maturing loans entail an increase of the borrowing requirement by a total of SEK 99 billion for 2025 and 2026 compared with the previous forecast. We expect a total borrowing requirement of SEK 472 billion for 2025, SEK 633 billion for 2026, and SEK 620 billion for 2027. Figure 11 shows the development of the borrowing requirement and its components, both between years and in relation to the previous forecast. Table 11 shows how the borrowing requirement is funded.

**Table 11 Funding plan**

SEK billion

Funding plan	Outcome 2024	Forecast 2025	25:1 2025	Forecast 2026	25:1 2026	Forecast 2027
T-bills	113	173	160	250	183	243
Liquidity management	134	134	141	142	189	132
<b>Sum of money market funding</b>	<b>247</b>	<b>307</b>	<b>301</b>	<b>392</b>	<b>371</b>	<b>375</b>
Nominal government bonds	72	118	118	216	146	220
Inflation-linked bonds	9	6	6	6	6	6
Foreign currency bonds	21	41	39	19	19	19
<b>Sum of bond funding</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>163</b>	<b>241</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>245</b>
<b>Total gross borrowing</b>	<b>348</b>	<b>472</b>	<b>464</b>	<b>633</b>	<b>543</b>	<b>620</b>

Note: Money market funding corresponds to outstanding stock at the end of December. 25:1 refers to the previous forecast.

Source: The Debt Office.


The Debt Office began gradually increasing the nominal government bond borrowing when we saw the budget shift from a surplus to a deficit. In the beginning of such a reversal, our strategy is to fund a larger part of the expected increase in the borrowing requirement by using short-term borrowing, before then starting to gradually increase the long-term borrowing. As we now foresee a longer period with large deficits, we are moving to nominal government bonds at a faster rate. We are also doing this to steer the average term to maturity of the central government debt towards the middle of the Government's target interval (see the Facts section on page 34).



The short-term borrowing also increases under the new plan, although not to the same extent as the long-term borrowing. The growing stock of treasury bills is mainly due to our redistribution from liquidity management. The borrowing in inflation-linked and foreign currency bonds is unchanged from the previous plan. The new plan also includes a foreign currency bond in 2027.

**Figure 11 Total gross borrowing requirement**

SEK billion




Note: The net borrowing requirement is the budget balance with the opposite sign. The post "Other" includes for example an adjustment due to the net borrowing requirement being reported by settlement date whereas borrowing is reported by trade date.

Source: The Debt Office.

With the plan we are now establishing, the distribution of various debt instruments in the central government debt will develop as shown in figure 12. Nominal government bonds continue to form the foundation and are the Debt Office's largest and most important funding source. The inflation-linked debt will be reduced ahead in accordance with the guidelines for central government debt management (see the Facts section on page 34).

Figure 12 Central government debt by instrument

SEK billion



Note: The central government debt including on-lending and assets under management. The amount refers to the stock at year-end. The stock of treasury bills and liquidity management varies over the years due to changes in the budget balance and is especially large at the end of the year because the central government regularly runs large deficits in December.

Source: The Debt Office.

## Facts

### Unchanged guidelines for maturity and composition

In accordance with the Debt Office's proposal, the Government has decided that the steering of the central government debt's composition and term to maturity will remain unchanged for 2026. This means that the ongoing phase-out of the foreign currency exposure and the reduction of inflation-linked debt will continue and the steering interval for term to maturity will remain in place.

According to the Government's guidelines, the foreign currency exposure shall therefore continue to be gradually phased out as of 1 January 2027. Derivative transactions are used in achieving the exposure's target level, thereby making it separate from the actual funding (borrowing). This means that the Debt Office can borrow in foreign currency in the international capital market – and in doing so maintain good borrowing preparedness – regardless of what the target level for the currency exposure is.

According to the guidelines, the inflation-linked krona debt is also to be gradually reduced and reach a target level of approximately SEK 80 billion at the end of 2029.

In putting together this year's proposed guidelines, the Debt Office has developed a method for analysing the composition and term to maturity of the central

government debt.<sup>2</sup> This developed analysis provides a more thorough basis for both the guidelines decisions themselves and their evaluation. Neither developments regarding term premia nor the new analysis of how maturity affects expected cost and risk have provided grounds to alter the steering of the term to maturity. The conclusions of the analyses must also be weighed against other aspects such as the size of the debt and how much short-term funding is needed. These considerations also support keeping the steering interval unchanged.

The Government's guidelines stipulate that the term to maturity of the central government debt be measured as average time to refixing (ATR) and continue to be steered towards 3.5–6 years. The Debt Office's borrowing plan is based on steering the term to maturity towards the middle of the range.

In addition to the unchanged term to maturity and composition, the adopted guidelines for 2026 contain some amendments to the points on how central government debt management is to be evaluated. There is also an amendment to the point on how the Debt Office is to take account of refinancing risk.

## Nominal bonds account for greatest increase

The total annual volume of nominal government bonds grows over the forecast period, from SEK 118 billion for 2025, SEK 216 billion for 2026, and SEK 220 billion for 2027. In January 2026, the Debt Office will raise the issuance volume of nominal government bonds per auction from SEK 6 billion to SEK 8 billion.

In advance of the next *Central Government Borrowing* report in May 2026, we will consider holding auctions more frequently with a lower supply each time, instead of continuing with auctions every other week and raising the volume per auction. Irrespective of the number of auctions that are held is the planned annual volume SEK 216 billion.

Next year, the Debt Office is, as previously announced, introducing two new bonds in the 10-year segment. SGB 1068, maturing on 9 February 2037, will be introduced through syndication on 11 March, contributing SEK 20 billion to the annual volume. In the fourth quarter next year, SGB 1069, maturing in 2038, will be introduced using a regular auction procedure.


The Debt Office will carry out the majority of the auctions in the ten-year segment and in the two-year and five-year reference bonds (see table 12). This is in line with the strategy of borrowing in a transparent and predictable manner with a focus on building up nominal government bonds as reference bonds. Figure 13 shows the distribution of the total issuance volume in 2026.

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<sup>2</sup> See the Focus Report *Framework for analysing cost and risk of central government debt – a simulation study*.

**Figure 13 Distribution of government-bond supply in auctions in 2026**

Per cent



Note: The figure illustrates how the overall volume in the Debt Office's auctions (including syndication) in 2026 is divided into different maturity segments. The "Other" category includes bonds that were previously ten-year reference bonds and are not yet included in the five-year or two-year segments.

Source: The Debt Office.

The issuance volume of the two longest bonds remains at SEK 750 million per half-year over the forecast period. The Debt Office has analysed the matter of regularly issuing new bonds with maturities longer than 12 years and determined that there is currently no reason for doing so, neither from the perspective of risk nor cost.

The Debt Office adapts the distribution among maturities to the size of the borrowing requirement. For more information on the volumes that we plan to issue in different maturity segments in the auctions until the next report, see table 2 in the summary or table 22 in the section with market information.

**Table 12 Reference bonds**

Reference bonds	2-year	5-year	10-year
Current	1060	1062	1066
From 17 Dec 2025	-	-	1067

Note: The reference bond in the electronic interbank market is the bond that is closest to two, five, or ten years in term to maturity. Reference bonds are changed on the IMM (International Money Market) dates: the third Wednesday in March, June, September, and December. The date of change of reference bonds refers to the settlement date.


Source: The Debt Office.

Since 2023, the Riksbank has sold off large portions of its holding of Swedish nominal government bonds and expects to discontinue these sales at the end of the year when the remaining holding is SEK 20 billion (excluding SGB 1059 and the government green bond). Figure 14 shows the Riksbank's sales and the Debt

Office's issues along with maturities. Viewed in this way, the net supply of nominal government bonds is at its lowest in 2025 and increases again in 2026. In 2027, when the Debt Office's higher issuance volume is not offset by any redemptions, the net supply increases even more.

**Figure 14 Sales and redemptions of nominal government bonds**

SEK billion



Note: The net supply of 2026 was corrected on December 2, 2025.

Source: The Debt Office and the Riksbank.


## Unchanged plan for inflation-linked bonds

The guidelines for central government debt management stipulate that the outstanding volume of inflation-linked bonds is to be reduced until 2029. According to plan, the Debt Office continues to issue inflation-linked bonds in regularly held auctions and the issuance volume remains at SEK 6 billion (see Figure 15).

With this plan, it is our assessment that we will in an appropriate manner reach the target, which is an outstanding volume of approximately SEK 80 billion in 2029. In coming years, we will continue to evaluate the progress towards the target and adjust the issuance volume as well as offer switches as necessary.

**Figure 15 Outstanding volume of inflation-linked bonds**

SEK billion



Note: Volume outstanding in nominal terms at year-end.

Source: The Debt Office.

## Facts

### New CPI base year affects inflation-linked bonds

As of 2026, Statistics Sweden (SCB) will update the base year for the Swedish Consumer Price Index (CPI), from 1980 to 2020.<sup>3</sup> The updated base year will affect the calculation of the pricing of the Debt Office's inflation-linked bonds as of March 2026.

In conjunction with the change of base year, Statistics Sweden has published a rescaling factor on its website. To calculate the index factor for outstanding inflation-linked bonds, the rescaling factor is to be used to rescale CPI with base year 2020 to reflect the former series. Accordingly, there will be no update to the base index.

When the Debt Office introduces new inflation-linked bonds, the base index will be specified according to the CPI with base year 2020.

For more information on Statistics Sweden's rescaling factor and instructions on calculating the index factor, see "Terms and conditions for government securities" on the Debt Office's website.

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/prices-and-economic-trends/price-statistics/consumer-price-index-cpi/produktrelaterat/news/updated-classification-and-reference-year-for-the-swedish-cpi/>

## Foreign currency bonds in 2026 and 2027

As previously communicated, the Debt Office plans to issue a new foreign currency bond in 2026. We also plan to issue a foreign currency bond in 2027. The foreign currency bond corresponds to approximately SEK 19 billion for each year.


Bonds in foreign currency are a flexible form of borrowing because they can be adapted to how the borrowing requirement develops. This is thus a complement to the short-term borrowing but with lower refinancing risk. We also issue commercial paper in foreign currency as part of the liquidity management operations. The foreign currency borrowing does not involve currency exposure in the central government debt since we hedge the borrowing.

## Increase in treasury bills and new auction format

The treasury bill borrowing is increasing more than we planned in May. We are raising the issuance volume at the same time as we are issuing more T-bills with longer maturities than previously. As a whole, this contributes to increasing the outstanding stock throughout the period – from SEK 173 billion at the end of 2025 to SEK 250 billion next year and SEK 243 billion in 2027 (see figure 16).

**Figure 16 Stock of treasury bills**

SEK billion



Source: The Debt Office.

On 18 February 2026, the Debt Office will switch auction format from multiple-price to single-price auctions for treasury bills. Single-priced auctions are already being used for inflation-linked bonds (see the In-depth section on page 42). As is the case for inflation-linked bonds, the pricing situation for treasury bills is uncertain, which supports the use of single-price auctions for treasury bills as well.

The Debt Office issues a new 12-month bill every three months maturing on an IMM date (the third Wednesday in March, June, September, and December). In the other months, we introduce a new three-month bill. For more information about


auction dates and which treasury bills we will be introducing, see table 25 under “Market information” at the end of the report.

The planned volume in the individual auctions varies within the SEK 10–22.5 billion range. The Debt Office plans the volumes in the individual auctions of treasury bills on the basis of seasonal patterns in the central government’s payments, and maturities. If necessary, we can make further adjustments ahead of each auction, depending on how the payments develop. This means, as previously, that decisions we make one week prior to an auction may differ from the planned volumes in the auction schedule.

The Debt Office is looking into the possibility of moving the auction day for treasury bills from Wednesdays to Tuesdays. This is in light of the planned change whereby the number of settlement dates for Swedish government securities will be changed from two days to one day as of 11 October 2027. Moving the auction day for treasury bills to Tuesdays would improve the synchronisation between the central government’s inflows and outflows of liquid funds and increase the opportunity for investors to match maturing bills with newly issued ones.

**Figure 17 Liquidity management**

SEK billion



Note: Nominal amount at current exchange rate including assets under management on the last day of each month. Positive amount indicates borrowing requirement, negative amount indicates cash surplus.

Source: The Debt Office.

As part of the liquidity management operations, the Debt Office funds the borrowing requirement that remains after the planned issues of treasury bills and bonds. This includes issuing treasury bills on a discretionary basis (tap issues), and commercial paper in foreign currency. In this plan, the volume of liquidity management instruments at the end of each year is lower than in the previous plan.



There are large variations within liquidity management, both between months and days (see figure 17). The amounts borrowed as part of liquidity management are continually adjusted to how the budget balance and the regular borrowing develop.

**Table 13 Important dates until next report**


Date	Time	Activity
18 February	11:00	First single-price auction for treasury bills
11 March		Syndication of SGB 1068
28 May	09:30	Central Government Borrowing report 2026:1

## Effects on debt's term to maturity

The Debt Office plans the borrowing so that the term to maturity measured as average time to refixing (ATR) is within the steering interval decided on by the Government. Our strategy is to steer the term to maturity towards the middle of this range (see figure 18).

**Figure 18 Maturity of the central government debt**

Years



Note: Up to January 2025, the Debt Office measured term to maturity as Macaulay duration (see the dotted line in the figure). Since then, we measure and make forecasts of the term to maturity as average time to refixing (ATR). The forecast shows the last day of each month, whereas outcomes are shown as the monthly mean. The pink dashed lines represent the steering interval for term to maturity in the Government's guidelines. This range is the same even after the change in method of measuring term to maturity from duration to ATR.

Source: The Debt Office.

## In-depth


### Evaluation of new auction format for inflation-linked bonds

At the beginning of 2025, the Debt Office changed the method of issuing inflation-linked bonds, from multiple-price auctions to single-price auctions. The Riksbank simultaneously continued to sell off its holding of inflation-linked bonds using multiple-price auctions. This provided a unique opportunity to evaluate the change of auction format. The results, which were presented in *Debt Office Commentary 2025:2*, indicate that the change has contributed to lower issue yields, which is an outcome of lower bid rates.

The feedback from primary dealers and investors about the change has been positive overall. An advantage mentioned regarding the new auction format is that, given the uncertain pricing situation for inflation-linked bonds, there is a lower risk of a bidder receiving allotment at a bid rate that significantly diverges from the other participants' bid rates. This risk is termed *winner's curse* in the academic literature.

**Figure 19 Interest rate differential between issue yield and mid-market rate**

Basis points



Note: Interest rate differential at close of auction. "Before" refers to the average of the last ten auctions in 2024 and "After" to the average of the first ten in 2025.

Sources: The Debt Office and The Riksbank.

### Lower issue yields and bid rates


The evaluation is based on a comparison between the Debt Office's and the Riksbank's respective auction outcomes, in which the evaluation period comprises the last ten outcomes prior to the change of format and the first two afterwards. Figure 19 shows the average before and after the change, for the Debt Office and

the Riksbank, respectively. The outcome variable measures the interest rate differential between the issue yield and the mid-market rate at the close of auction. The outcomes show that the interest rate differential decreased by 0.05 basis points for the Debt Office and increased by 0.77 basis points for Riksbank. This indicates a relative decrease in borrowing cost of 0.82 basis points during the forecast period.

Figure 20 shows the outcome of the interest rate differential between the average bid rate and the mid-market rate at the close of auction. The outcomes show that the interest rate differential for the bid rate decreased by 1.69 basis points for the Debt Office and increased by 1.57 basis points for the Riksbank. This indicates a relative decrease of the bid rate by 3.26 basis points during the forecast period.

**Figure 20 Interest rate differential between bid rate and mid-market rate**

Basis points



Note: Interest rate differential at close of auction. "Before" refers to the average of the last ten auctions in 2024 and "After" to the average of the first ten in 2025.

Sources: The Debt Office and The Riksbank.

Altogether, the results presented in the evaluation indicate that the switch from multiple-price auctions to single-price auctions has contributed to a lower issue yield, which is an outcome of lower bid rates. The results are consistent with the fact that single-price auctions reduce the risk of the *winner's curse* phenomenon, and therefore lead to bids that better reflect bidders' valuation of the bonds. This is also in keeping with the feedback we have received from market participants.

# Appendix of Tables

**Table 14 International forecasts**

Percent change

GDP	Outcome 2024	Forecast 2025	25:1 2025	Forecast 2026	25:1 2026	Forecast 2027
Euro area	0.8	1.2	0.8	1.3	1.2	1.8
US	2.8	1.9	1.4	1.8	1.5	1.9

Note: 25:1 refers to the previous forecast. Forecasts are from NIER, the forecast 25:1 is from Bloomberg consensus.

Sources: Bloomberg, National Institute of Economic Research (NIER).

**Table 15 Central government net lending**

SEK billion

Central government net lending	Outcome 2024	Forecast 2025	Forecast 2026	Forecast 2027
<b>Budget balance</b>	<b>-104</b>	<b>-103</b>	<b>-173</b>	<b>-194</b>
Sales of limited companies	-1	0	0	0
Parts of Debt Office's net lending	10	6	20	29
Other delimitations etc.	-12	-24	-33	-16
<b>Sum delimitations</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>-18</b>	<b>-13</b>	<b>13</b>
Accruals of taxes	25	0	-5	2
Accruals of interest payments etc.	11	26	23	18
<b>Sum accruals</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>Central government net lending</b>	<b>-71</b>	<b>-94</b>	<b>-168</b>	<b>-161</b>
<b>Per cent of GDP</b>	<b>-1.1</b>	<b>-1.4</b>	<b>-2.5</b>	<b>-2.2</b>

Source: The Debt Office.

**Table 16 Budget balance forecast per month**

SEK billion

Month	Primary balance	Debt Office net lending	Interest payments	Budget balance
November 25	10.0	5.5	-3.4	12.1
December 25	-70.9	-61.1	-4.0	-136.0
January 26	-23.9	-5.7	3.2	-26.4
February 26	61.0	2.5	-1.3	62.1
March 26	-16.1	5.3	-3.4	-14.2
April 26	-36.2	2.9	1.7	-31.7
May 26	48.1	-2.4	-3.9	41.9
June 26	-50.5	5.4	-14.3	-59.5
July 26	-14.8	7.3	1.4	-6.2
August 26	26.8	3.3	-0.5	29.6
September 26	-30.9	6.3	-1.5	-26.2
October 26	-27.8	6.3	-0.2	-21.8
November 26	6.6	7.6	-2.5	11.8
December 26	-67.0	-62.0	-3.3	-132.4

Source: Source: The Debt Office.

**Table 17 Budget balance changes between years, effect on budget balance**

SEK billion

Changes between years, effect on budget balance	Outcome 2024	Forecast 2025	Forecast 2026	Forecast 2027
<b>Budget balance, level</b>	<b>-104</b>	<b>-103</b>	<b>-173</b>	<b>-194</b>
<b>Change from previous year</b>	<b>-123</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-70</b>	<b>-21</b>
Income from taxes	59	30	16	81
Grants to local governments	-16	1	-7	-1
Labour market	-4	-3	-1	2
Social insurance	-19	1	-6	0
Defence	-21	-37	-44	-7
EU-fee	3	-9	6	-5
Transport	3	1	-12	-4
Legal system	-4	-2	-6	-7
State share dividends	0	2	-2	2
Other	-108	21	0	-61
<b>Sum of primary balance</b>	<b>-107</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>-56</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Debt Office's net lending</b>	<b>-27</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>-21</b>	<b>-15</b>
<b>Interest on government debt</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>-10</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>-8</b>

Source: The Debt Office.

**Table 18 Forecast comparison**

SEK billion

Forecast	Budget balance	Sale of state assets	Adjusted budget balance
Debt Office: 2025	-103	0	-103
Debt Office: 2026	-173	0	-173
Debt Office: 2027	-194	0	-194
Government: 2025	-111	5	-116
Government: 2026	-167	5	-172
Government: 2027	-181	5	-186
NIER: 2025	-57	0	-57
NIER: 2026	-140	0	-140
ESV: 2025	-79	0	-79
ESV: 2026	-161	0	-161
ESV:2027	-132	0	-132

Note: Publication date is for the Debt Office 2025-11-27, the Government 2025-09-18, NIER 2025-09-24 ESV 2025-11-18.

**Table 19 From net borrowing requirement to central government debt**

SEK billion

From net borrowing requirement to central government debt	Outcome 2024	Forecast 2025	Forecast 2026	Forecast 2027
<b>Net borrowing requirement (budget balance with opposite sign)</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>194</b>
Business day adjustment etc. <sup>1</sup>	27	0	1	0
<b>Net borrowing per business day</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>194</b>
<b>A. Net amount including money market assets</b>	<b>1 083</b>	<b>1 186</b>	<b>1 360</b>	<b>1 554</b>
Inflation compensation	65	55	45	35
Exchange rate effects	0	-3	0	0
<b>B. Net amount to current exchange rate incl. inflation compensation</b>	<b>1 148</b>	<b>1 238</b>	<b>1 404</b>	<b>1 589</b>
Assets under management	3	2	2	2
<b>C. Central government debt</b>	<b>1 151</b>	<b>1 240</b>	<b>1 406</b>	<b>1 591</b>
Assets under management	-3	-2	-2	-2
On-lending	-5	-8	-8	-8
<b>D. Central government debt incl. on-lending and assets under management</b>	<b>1 143</b>	<b>1 230</b>	<b>1 396</b>	<b>1 581</b>
Nominal GDP	6 380	6 552	6 836	7 157
C. Central government debt, % of GDP	18	19	21	22
D. Central government debt incl. on-lending and money market assets, percentage share of GDP	18	19	20	22

<sup>1</sup> A difference occurs as borrowing is reported by business date and net borrowing requirement by settlement date.

Source: The Debt Office.

**Table 20 Total borrowing requirement**

SEK billion

Total borrowing requirement, gross	Outcome 2024	Forecast 2025	Forecast 2026	Forecast 2027
<b>Net borrowing requirement (budget balance with opposite sign)</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>194</b>
Trade date adjustment etc. <sup>1</sup>	27	0	1	0
<b>Retail funding &amp; collateral, net<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>
Treasury bills	123	113	173	250
Liquidity management instruments	97	134	134	142
<b>Sum of money market redemptions<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>220</b>	<b>247</b>	<b>307</b>	<b>392</b>
Nominal government bonds	1	85	97	0
Inflation-linked bonds	0	34	34	33
Green bonds	0	0	0	0
Foreign currency bonds <sup>4</sup>	0	0	21	0
<b>Sum of bond redemptions, net switches and buy-backs</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>152</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>Total gross borrowing requirement</b>	<b>348</b>	<b>472</b>	<b>633</b>	<b>620</b>

<sup>1</sup> A difference occurs as borrowing is reported by business date and net borrowing requirement by settlement date.

<sup>2</sup> Net change in retail borrowing and collateral.

<sup>3</sup> Initial stock maturing within 12 months. Liquidity management is net, including assets under management. Liquidity management includes commercial paper.

<sup>4</sup> Calculated with the original issuance exchange rate.

Source: The Debt Office.

**Table 21 Net borrowing requirement and net borrowing**

SEK billion

	Outcome 2024	Forecast 2025	Forecast 2026	Forecast 2027
<b>Net borrowing requirement and net borrowing</b>				
Net borrowing requirement (budget balance with opposite sign)	104	103	173	194
Business day adjustment etc. <sup>1</sup>	27	0	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>194</b>
<b>Retail funding &amp; collateral, net</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>-3</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>0</b>
T-bills	-10	60	77	-8
Liquidity management	37	1	8	-10
<b>Sum of net money market funding</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>-18</b>
Nominal government bonds	71	33	119	220
Inflation-linked bonds	9	-28	-28	-27
Green bonds	0	0	0	0
Foreign currency bonds	21	41	-2	19
<b>Sum of net bond market funding</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>212</b>
<b>Total net borrowing</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>194</b>

<sup>1</sup> A difference occurs as borrowing is reported by business date and net borrowing requirement by settlement date.

Source: The Debt Office.

# Market information

Table 22 Planned issue volume of nominal government bonds over the next six months

SEK billion

Maturity category	Nominal government bond	28 November 2025 – 28 May 2026
10-year	SGB 1067 2.5% 15 Oct 36	32
10-year pre-issued	SGB 1067 2.5% 15 Oct 36	4
	SGB 1068 x.xx% 09 Feb 37	22
5-year	SGB 1062 0.125% 12 May 31	17.75
2-year	SGB 1060 0.75% 12 May 28	12
> 12-year	SGB 1064 1.375% 23 Jun 71	0.75
	SGB 1053 3.5% 30 Mar 39	2
Other maturities	SGB 1066 2.25% 11 May 35	6
	SGB 1065 1.75% 11 Nov 33	2
	SGB 1056 2.25% 01 Jun 32	5.5
<b>Total supply</b>		<b>104</b>

Note: The category of "Other maturities" includes bonds that were previously 10-year reference bonds and are not yet included in the 5- or 2-year categories. The planned supply of SGB 1068 includes a syndication of SEK 20 billion. The indicated volumes apply assuming that the auctions are fully allocated. The Debt Office will not compensate if any auction is cut, but will continue to issue according to the plan.

Table 23 Nominal government bonds, auction dates

Announcement date	Auction date	Settlement date
26-Nov-25	3-Dec-25	5-Dec-25
10-Dec-25	17-Dec-25	19-Dec-25
7-Jan-26	14-Jan-26	16-Jan-26
21-Jan-26	28-Jan-26	30-Jan-26
4-Feb-26	11-Feb-26	13-Feb-26
18-Feb-26	25-Feb-26	27-Feb-26
27-Nov-25	11-Mar-26*	13-Mar-26
18-Mar-26	25-Mar-26	27-Mar-26
1-Apr-26	8-Apr-26	10-Apr-26
15-Apr-26	22-Apr-26	24-Apr-26
29-Apr-26	6-May-26	8-May-26
13-May-26	20-May-26	22-May-26
27-May-26	3-Jun-26	5-Jun-26
10-Jun-26	17-Jun-26	22-Jun-26
24-Jun-26	1-Jul-26	3-Jul-26

\*Syndication



**Table 24 Inflation-linked government bonds, auction dates**

<b>Announcement date</b>	<b>Auction date</b>	<b>Settlement date</b>
4-Dec-25	11-Dec-25	15-Dec-25
12-Feb-26	19-Feb-26	23-Feb-26
12-Mar-26	19-Mar-26	23-Mar-26
9-Apr-26	16-Apr-26	20-Apr-26
4-Jun-26	11-Jun-26	15-Jun-26

**Table 25 T-bills, auction dates**

<b>Announcement date</b>	<b>Auction date</b>	<b>Settlement date</b>	<b>Due date</b>
3-Dec-25	10-Dec-25	12-Dec-25	16-Dec-26
30-Dec-25	7-Jan-26	9-Jan-26	15-Apr-26
14-Jan-26	21-Jan-26	23-Jan-26	-
28-Jan-26	4-Feb-26	6-Feb-26	20-May-26
11-Feb-26	18-Feb-26	20-Feb-26	-
25-Feb-26	4-Mar-26	6-Mar-26	17-Mar-27
11-Mar-26	18-Mar-26	20-Mar-26	-
25-Mar-26	1-Apr-26	7-Apr-26	15-Jul-26
8-Apr-26	15-Apr-26	17-Apr-26	-
22-Apr-26	29-Apr-26	4-May-26	19-Aug-26
5-May-26	12-May-26	15-May-26	-
20-May-26	27-May-26	29-May-26	-
3-Jun-26	10-Jun-26	12-Jun-26	16-Jun-27
17-Jun-26	24-Jun-26	26-Jun-26	-
1-Jul-26	8-Jul-26	10-Jul-26	21-Oct-26

Note: The Debt Office introduces a new 12-month bill every three months maturing on an IMM date: the third Wednesday in March, June, September, and December. In the other months, a new three-month bill will be introduced. The Due date column indicates the maturity date for the new bill. In addition to the new bill introduced, the Debt Office may also sell another bill with a different maturity date.

**The Swedish National Debt Office is the central government financial manager and the national resolution and deposit insurance authority. The Debt Office thus plays an important role in the Swedish economy as well as in the financial market.**



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